GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

FAR EAST COMMAND

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

CIVIL INTELLIGENCE SECTION

SPECIAL REPORT

SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

PART XV

"CABINET RE-SHUFFLE AND CHANGKUFENG"

(20 May - 13 Aug 1938)

95-GHQ 93-2.9

RESTRICTED

These Memoirs are the private property of the family of the late Baron Kamao Harada and their reproduction in whole or in part, or use thereof in any abridged form, is not authorized except with express written permission of the owner.

Yuasa
14 FEB 1949
45750

Restricted Classification
Removed Per
Executive Order 10501

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

FAR EAST COMMAND

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

****

CIVIL INTELLIGENCE SECTION

****

THE SAIONJI - HARADA MEMOIRS

PART FIFTEEN: CABINET RESHUFFLE AND CHANGKUFENG

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter		Page
274	KONOYE FAVORS ITAGAKI	2115
275	SAIONJI FEARS FOR UGAKI	2124
276	UGAKI COAXED INTO CABINET	2132
277	EMPEROR URGES COORDINATION	2137
278	ITAGAKI WANTS SHIRATORI	2146
279	PLANS FOR DIPLOMATIC SHIFTS	2154
280	VARIOUS PROPOSALS AIRED	2164
281	NAVY OFFICERS COMPLAIN	2169
282	CHANGKUFENG BORDER CLASH	2178
283	EMPEROR CHIDES ARMY	2189
284	COOL ADVICE ON CHANGKUFENG	2196
285	NAVY MEN EXPOUND VIEWS	2204
286	CHANGKUFENG INCIDENT SETTLED	2217

Restricted Classification
Removed Per
Executive Order 10501

Saionji - Harada Memoirs

Chapter 274
(20 May 1938)

Konoye Favors Itagaki

Translated by Miss Miwako Yanamoto

I (HARADA) met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal on the 12th. I told him about the circumstances up to the present and of the relationship between the Army and the Cabinet. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal had the same sort of anxiety.

Previously, Count MAKINO had phoned me and said: "I have something to give you. Please come over." I (HARADA) went to Count MAKINO's place in the evening. I saw Count MAKINO for the first time in a long while and talked with him about various matters. He handed me a letter from Ambassador YOSHIDA to Prince SAIONJI. He said: "He (YOSHIDA) has written me a letter saying that the war must be brought to an end as soon as possible. He thinks that we should use some country that will be agreeable to all nations and break the deadlock over this difficult situation soon. The present CHAMBERLAIN Cabinet of England wants to solve this strife between Japan and China as soon as possible. They would like to bring the matter to a close. Since it seems that they feel that they would gladly lend assistance to any request of the Japanese Government, he thinks it might be well for the Japanese Government to think of something as soon as possible. Since he (YOSHIDA) has written me in this vein, I think the import in his letter to Prince SAIONJI will probably be the same. Although there is probably a letter or telegram directly to the Foreign Minister from Ambassador YOSHIDA, I imagine he thought it might be easier for the government to handle the matter if Prince SAIONJI were to add his opinion." He (MAKINO) said: "Please give my best regards to Prince SAIONJI." I (HARADA) left MAKINO and went home.

RESTRICTED

Konoye Favors Itagaki

That night I (HARADA) met KONOYE. Regarding the reorganization of the Cabinet, he said: "When the War Minister resigns, I am thinking of having the Cabinet resign en bloc. Then, I shall request another Imperial Command (to form a new Cabinet). I am thinking of forming a Cabinet of eight Ministers of State. They will handle the various Ministries in the following manner: KIDO, Ministries of Home Affairs and Welfare; IKEDA, Ministries of Agriculture, Finance and Commerce and Industry; UGAKI, Ministries of Overseas Affairs and Foreign Affairs; SUETSUGU, Ministry of Education, SHIONO, Ministry of Justice, as at present; then Ministries of Army and Navy, each with their own Ministers. The present Ministers will become Vice-Ministers of their respective Ministries, and these Vice-Ministers will be administrative officials I have discussed this plan with KIDO, but.... If SUGIYAMA resigns as Minister of War, I would like to put up a 'combination' of ITAGAKI and TOJO." I (HARADA) said again, as I have said before: "If you meddle in the disputes within the Army, you may create a bad affiliation that might follow you into the future. Also, I do not think you should interfere. Therefore, you must not suggest anyone by saying ITAGAKI is good or someone else is good." However, the Premier earnestly said: "If UMEZU is going to become War Minister, I shall resign. If you ask me why - for instance, he says: 'I am dispatching two divisions,' but he doesn't tell me where or for what purpose. He doesn't talk to me about the actions of the Army. He only demands a budget and submits the demand at the Cabinet meeting. Joint Staff Headquarters doesn't tell me anything about strategical operations, or what the plans are for the future. Neither does the War Minister try to tell me. If that is the case, I cannot bear this important responsibility. Perhaps this

phenomemon arises because the Army and the General Staff Headquarters are split. In any event, I cannot stand it."

On the morning of the 13th, I (HARADA) met KIDO. I asked him about the reorganization (of the Cabinet). He also talked in the same vein as KONOYE. KIDO said: "KONOYE stopped at my place last night on his way home. He said: 'I would like to appoint ITAGAKI as War Minister--meaning: 'I would like to expedite the matter as soon as possible.'" It seems they parted with KIDO agreeing with KONOYE's opinion.

I (HARADA) again saw KONOYE on the night of May 14. KONOYE said: "During the conversation between the Emperor and Prince KAN-IN, Prince KAN-IN said to the Emperor: 'The War Minister said: 'I will resign very shortly.' However, he still hasn't resigned. It is very bad for the Chief of the General Staff to change during wartime. However, a change of War Ministers has no direct connection with war operations, and I think there would be no objection. It is strange that he has not yet resigned.' I believe ITAGAKI would be suitable as the next War Minister.' The Emperor replied: 'He will probably be all right.'" Prince KAN-IN probably told Deputy Chief TADA about his conversation (with the Emperor). Deputy Chief TADA told the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet; and the Premier heard it from the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet. That is probably the order in which the news was transmitted.

I (HARADA) asked Vice Chief AOKI of the Planning Bureau to come over at noon. I casually asked him about the internal situation of the Army. AOKI only said: "I do not know the true details at all. First of all, UMEZU has quite a bit of power."

I (HARADA) met Councillor IKEDA on the 15th. IKEDA said:

"A member of General Staff Headquarters came and said: 'TTAGAKI is utterly impossible. The reason is, in a sense, his unit suffered great casualties in the two engagements. He is very unpopular.' There isn't a remote chance that ITAGAKI will become a War Minister in the future, is there?"

I (HARADA) said: "After a Councillors' meeting or at any time that you should see Premier KONOYE will you, for caution's sake, say to KONOYE: 'There is quite a bit of trouble between the War Ministry and the General Staff Headquarters at present. In any event, it will be harmful if it should seem that you are favoring one side.'" IKEDA was very much in accord with my opinion.

I (HARADA) met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in the afternoon of the 15th at his official residence. We conversed about various matters. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was in quite a dilemma and was troubled.

I (HARADA) left on the night of the 15th and arrived in Okitsu on the 16th. I gave a detailed report to Prince SAIONJI of matters up to the present. Prince SAIONJI said: "Whether it's something good or bad, KONOYE should show more discretion as Premier and not talk about private affairs of the Cabinet to outsiders nor state criticism of his Cabinet colleagues to others. It might be better for him to resign once at an opportune moment. It may be better for KONOYE to await another future occasion. Still, it was good education for him. I've thought it over, but it seems very strange that Japan doesn't deal with CHIANG Kai Shek in connection with Chinese problems. I wonder what the reason is. When Emperor TAISHO was a lad, he went to Prince ITO's resort home. He watched them catching fish with a throw-net. Someone brought a fish to him and said: 'It was caught on

this beach.' Among those who had come with him (Emperor TAISHO), there were some who made fun of it as if they thought it was impossible to catch fish on a beach like this. However, Emperor TAISHO said: 'If the owner says it was caught here, why then, it must be true.' He was very intelligent."

I (HARADA) returned to Oiso on the night of the 16th. In the evening of the 18th, I returned to Tokyo. I went immediately to the Koryu. There at 6:30, I had a leisurely dinner with the U.S. Ambassador, Count KABAYAMA, SAIONJI Koichi and SHIRASU. We indulged in friendly conversation as a farewell to Count KABAYAMA who was leaving for America.

I (HARADA) visited the Navy Minister on the morning of the 19th at 8 o'clock. We discussed what had happened since the last time we met. The Vice Minister of the Navy said: "The Finance Ministry says: 'We are running short of funds.' They are slow in giving us the money which was promised us for military preparations and the war continues. Unless one or the other is solved soon, it will become a real headache. We must bring the war to an end as soon as possible."

From around 11 am, Premier KONOYE and I (HARADA) were invited to the resort home of President OTANI of the steamship company (Nippon Yusen Kaisha) at Abiko. It was raining. We went together by automobile to Abiko. On the way, the Premier told me various things. He said: "The Emperor told Prince KAN-IN: 'When the War Minister is changed and things settle down, isn't KONOYE going to get ready to run away (resign)? Isn't there some plan to prevent KONOYE from running away (resigning)?'" Prince KAN-IN probably told that to Deputy Chief TADA immediately and it reached KONOYE's ear immediately from the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet.

KONOYE said: "Two or three days ago, the War Minister

came and said: 'I am going to resign due to ill health. As my successor, I think that first of all I would like to suggest FURUSHO. If FURUSHO isn't possible, then NISHIO. Further, if NISHIO isn't possible, ITAGAKI is the last resort.. I replied: 'If you talk about resigning because of illness, then I certainly would like to resign first due to illness.'" Previously when KONOYE had talked about resigning, the War Minister had told him, "It would trouble us if you resign." That is probably why KONOYE replied as he did. The War Minister said to that: "In any event, when (the battle of) Suchow is finished and things settle down for a time, I shall resign."

KONOYE said (to me): "If UMEZU becomes his successor, I couldn't possible continue. I still think ITAGAKI would be best. I think it will probably be ITAGAKI." I (HARADA) tried saying again: "No matter what, you must not meddle in private disputes (of the Army). You must not nominate or suggest anyone." KONOYE replied: "I cannot work together with a person who tells me to take the responsibilities but doesn't tell me where and for what purpose he is sending troops. After all, a War Minister is a Minister of State, and it would be distressing if he could not talk with us. I am not sure whether ITAGAKI will be either good or bad. If the matter doesn't settle down (with him as War Minister), I wouldn't know what to do." While he was talking we reached Abiko.

When we reached Abiko, we found out that Marquis HOSOKAWA and Marquis INOUYE were invited also. Marquis MATSUDAIRA came later. We ate together and then played golf. When Marquis MATSUDAIRA came, he said he had just come to Abiko from the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal's place where

he had discussed various matters with him. Marquis MATSUDAIRA told the following concerning what the Chief of the General Staff (Prince KAN-IN) had said to the Emperor: "The War Minister will submit his resignation in a day or two. Minister SUGIYAMA recommended FURUSHO or NISHIO as the next War Minister. General Staff Headquarters rebuffed this. Then the War Minister said: 'How about ITAGAKI?' The reply was: 'In that case, General Staff Headquarters approves.' Besides, it is known to Premier KONOYE that NISHIO, the Inspector-General of Military Training, agrees with ITAGAKI. As a result, the three Chiefs (War Minister, Chief of General Staff, and Inspector-General of Military Training) agreed on ITAGAKI. However, the War Minister saw the Chief of the General Staff (Prince KAN-IN) this morning again. At that time, he said: 'How about FURUSHO?' General Staff Headquarters said: 'We cannot consent because of his health.' Minister SUGIYAMA said: 'I shall check up on FURUSHO's health.' NISHIO, the Inspector-General of Military Training who was present, was reserved about stating whether he approved or disapproved. Then he (Inspector-Gen. of Mil. Tr.) left for Ise. The Chief of General Staff said: 'In the long run, it will probably be ITAGAKI.' There are some discrepancies in the above story. In the beginning, he (Prince KAN-IN) had decided on ITAGAKI, but the latter part sounds like a promise. His words also seemed to treat the War Minister as if he were in the same position as the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet and not very important."

"The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal who heard this from the Emperor said: 'The War Minister must not be treated so lightly.' He told the Emperor his supposition that Premier KONOYE probably won't be able to work together with anyone

but ITAGAKI. He (Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal) also told the Emperor: 'The War Minister must be someone who can work hand in hand with the Premier. If the War Minister is decided upon by just the three Chiefs (War Minister, Chief of General Staff, and Inspector-General of Military Training) without the consent of the Premier, it might, in some instances, bring about the collapse of the Cabinet. The three Chiefs would have to bear that political responsibility.' The Emperor replied: 'Shall I call the Chief of the General Staff (Prince KAN-IN) once more and warn him about that point?' He (Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal) stated his approval, and that measure was to be taken."

Marquis MATSUDAIRA related the above to the Premier. The Premier said definitely: "As Premier, I do not think I can work together with anyone but ITAGAKI at present. We will resign en masse." In the conversation of the Chief of the General Staff (with the Emperor), He said that War Minister SUGIYAMA had verbally expressed his intention to resign to the Premier. The Premier had said something that sounded like: "Naturally, I shall resign before you do." Premier KONOYE was questioned on this point. He said: "I didn't mean it that way. Until now, I have been saying that I wanted to resign and the War Minister has been dissuading me. In connection with that, I think it was some figure of speech. They may have sounded like that."

Marquis MATSUDAIRA went to the private residence of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal that night. He relayed Premier KONOYE's opinion. He asked about the Chief of the General Staff's (Prince KAN-IN's) visit to the Palace. When the Emperor and the Chief of the General Staff (Prince KAN-IN) met this time, the Emperor told him about the points

that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal had warned him of in the morning. The Chief of the General Staff asked: "Do you think KONOYE will resign unless it's ITAGAKI?" The Emperor replied: "He probably will, in eight or nine cases out of ten." The Chief of the General Staff asked again: "In that case, if it's ITAGAKI, will he remain in office?" The Emperor replied: "He probably will in eight or nine cases out of ten." The import of the reply was the opposite of the previous one (He will resign; he won't resign). The Chief of the General Staff (Prince KAN-IN) said: "In that case, if the War Minister should be stubborn at the meeting of the three Chiefs, we'll push it through, two to one." However, since the War Minister had once suggested ITAGAKI and if it should come to that, I think the three Chiefs will be unanimous. At that time, the Chief of the General Staff reported: "The resignation of War Minister SUGIYAMA will probably be submitted around the 25th." He was probably thinking of a time in connection with the fall of Suchow. MATSUDAIRA again told the Premier and me about this matter.

Saionji - Harada Memoirs

Chapter 275
(26 May 1938)

Saionji Feurs for Ugaki

Translated by Miss Miwako Yanamoto

On the 21st, I (HARADA) met the Navy Minister and the Vice Minister of the Navy at the Minister's official residence. We conversed about the general situation. The Navy Minister had some doubt as to whether matters could be skillfully handled.

I (HARADA) questioned HORINOUCHI, the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, by phone. There seemed to be nothing new in particular. I visited the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at his private residence at night. We conversed for about two hours. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal said: "General Staff Headquarters is acting very outrageously. They say: 'General Staff Headquarters and the War Ministry are not on bad terms. The rumor about the problem of the resignation of the War Minister started because the Premier and the War Minister do not get along.' Although they themselves endeavored to oust the leaders of the present War Ministry of which the War Minister is the central figure, they have tried to shift the blame on the Premier. They are very cowardly. Anyway, it puts us in a pickle." The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was full of anxiety about this problem.

I (HARADA) visited the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet at his official residence in Nagata-cho that afternoon. I told the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet: "The fact that there has been discord between the Army and the Premier, that is to say, between the War Minister and the Premier, and the fact that the War Minister is going to resign, create a very bad effect on other nations. Not only that, we would be giving China material which they could use to their advantage. If the Cabinet must resign, it should be done so that it will

RESTRICTED

seem that it happened due to a revision of foreign policy. It must be handled in a manner that will be advantageous to Japan and disadvantageous to the enemy. I want you to be careful to see that it doesn't result in appearing as if the Premier was defeated by a group in the Army or that the Premier was used as a puppet by a group in the Army." The Chief Secretary of the Cabinet said: "I am very much in accord with you and shall do my utmost." I then left.

I (HARADA) went to SAIONJI Hachiro's place at Gotenyama early in the morning of the 22nd. I told him various facts concerning the Palace.

On the 23rd, MATSUDAIRA came to my place immediately after reaching Tokyo Station upon his return from Fukui. I told him about meeting the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal on the night of the [illegible].

After that, I (HARADA) went to KIDO's place around 9:30. KIDO said: "Things are going quite smoothly. I think that IKEDA and UGAKI will join the Cabinet. A messenger has already gone to ITAGAKI and I think we shall get a reply right away whether he will accept the post as War Minister." We talked for a while then KAZAMI, the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet arrived. I excused myself and waited in another room. After the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet went home, I (HARADA) again met KIDO. He said: "The Chief of the Personnel Bureau has gone to North China to approach ITAGAKI. I think there will be a reply from Tientsin either tomorrow night or the night after that, in which case, everything will move smoothly."

I (HARADA) called War Minister SUGIYAMA by phone from home in the afternoon. I asked: "There's a rumor that you are going to resign, but what is it all about?" The War

Minister and Vice Minister at the Navy Minister's official residence in the afternoon at 2 o'clock. YONAI was very worried and said: "I wonder if UGAKI is suitable as Foreign Minister. It's strange that someone who is not suitable for the position of Premier is all right as Foreign Minister. In fact, it's a very funny reorganization (of the Cabinet). It's very strange." The Navy Minister was quite worried.

I (HARADA) met the Foreign Minister at some time past 3 o'clock. The Foreign Minister said: "I don't remember whether I've told you this or not, but I have already told the Premier: 'I would like to resign when you reorganize (the Cabinet).....' If there is going to be a reorganization in the near future, I would like very much to resign. Foreign relations are very difficult. It can't be handled as simply as everyone thinks. The Belgian Ambassador came to me some time ago and said: 'I think there is a possibility that CHIANG Kai Shek will resign.' Then British Ambassador CRAIGIE came and said: 'CHIANG Kai Shek probably won't resign for some time. I think he will stubbornly stick to his position.' Since CHIANG Kai Shek has already lost his sense of discrimination, he will probably stick it out. Things just won't go the way you want them to."

I (HARADA) went to Oiso in the evening of the 23rd. I rested one night and left early the next morning for Okitsu. At 10:30, I went to Prince SAIONJI's place and made a general report. I relayed to Prince SAIONJI what the Premier had said in connection with UGAKI and IKEDA joining the Cabinet: "Of course, I (KONOYE) will coax them. However, in addition, I would like to have words of encouragement from SAIONJI, to the effect of: 'Please help KONOYE and do your best.'" Prince SAIONJI replied: "I'll have nothing to do with that sort of thing. IKEDA may be a just and wonderful person. However,

we can t tell if IKEDA will be good in everything. KAYA might b better in certain respects. To appoint UGAKI as Foreign Minister is, I think, a very dangerous step. The reason is that if and when this Cabinet resigns, I think that UGAKI will be the number one man (as a possibility for appointment as the next Premier). In spite of criticisms against him, he is quite an influential man. He has a lot of spirit and is a politician of real ability. It would be distressing if the reputation of such a character were affected. The position of Foreign Minister is a job in which it is exceedingly easy to have one's reputation harmed. On the other hand, we must consider whether UGAKI is suitable for the position of Foreign Minister. UGAKI has a lot of hangers-on. If it were internal administration, it would be one thing; but if he were to be influenced by them in foreign policies, they would constitute a great hindrance. That is why I really wonder about his suitability...." He was very worried. The gist of it was that he was turning down KONOYE's request.

I (HARADA) said: "The public feels that you are supoorting this Cabinet to the end. He (KONOYE) is not asking you to coax them. If you do not at least say: 'Please help KONOYE,' KONOYE will say: 'In that case, is Prince SAIONJI opposed to this?' It would blunt KONOYE's feelings somewhat. On the other hand, if you say: 'Do your best,' it will carry great import to them (UGAKI and IKEDA). Consequently, they will feel better about joining the Cabinet and will do their utmost after they have joined. I think that KONOYE made this request because he wanted to make it as pleasant as possible for the men who are joining the Cabinet. I do not think he is asking you to say that against your will so...." Prince

SAIONJI replied: "I would first like to think over UGAKI's appointmen . Please tell him to wait. That is to say, please tell him: 'SAIONJI wants to weigh UGAKI's appointment.'" I (HARADA) decided to tell him(KONOYE) in exactly the same manner when I ret.. ed. I had lunch at Prince SAIONJI's place. During the meal, I phoned the Cabinet and called KIDO wh. was in the midst of a Cabinet meeting. I told him in advance about the conversation I just had with SAIONJI. KIDO said: "The fact is that the Premier already talked to UGAKI yesterday and asked him. I told HIROTA: 'Please resign.' At any rate, the matter has already been determined. There is no reply yet (from UGAKI)." I (HARADA reported this to Prince SAIONJI and came home.

After I (HARADA) returned, I phoned UGAKI and IKEDA and asked them about the circumstances. Gen. UGAKI said: "The Premier talked to me yesterday. The fact is, I have discussed the matter with IKEDA and told him: 'It's difficult to discern the internal situation of the Army. Even if a telegram of acceptance (from ITAGAKI for the position of War Minister) has come, I don't think the Chief of the Personnel Bureau has actually met ITAGAKI yet. Matters hinge on what the Chief of the Personnel Bureau says when they meet and what reply he will get. There is no telling how they will act or whether at any time he might cancel his acceptance. Until it finally reached the point of a real decision, you cannot depend on it. Lest matters become confused again should we accept before the War Minister has been determined, wouldn't it be better if we accepted after the War Minister has really been decided?' I told this to IKEDA and we intend to accept under those circumstances."

KONOYE was very worried so I told KONOYE about this

conversation. I relayed the views of Prince SAIONJI in general. I only told Premier KUNOYE: "Prince SAIONJI said: 'I am not particularly opposed to it. Only I don't want to come forth with advice. I don't want UGAKI's reputation to be harmed.'"

In the afternoon, I (HARADA) met the Navy Minister and the Vice Minister of the Navy. YAMAMOTO, the Vice Minister of the Navy said: 'I knew what sort of person UMEZU was up till now, but my knowledge wasn't detailed. Yesterday, returning from the Vice Ministers meeting, he was very indignant and spoke clearly to me. I felt the same way about everything he said. That is: 'The Premier has never said independently: 'How about doing it this way?; or, 'Why not do it that way?' He has always taken a passive attitude. If matters become too troublesome, he takes to his bed. He has no insight of our laborious efforts to bring back military discipline. He only wants to change personnel at the suggestion of one group. It is a disgusting story.' He expressed himself explicitly about the Premier's attitude and was very angry. I have never seen him so angry before."

When I (HARADA) visited Prince TAKAMATSU at his home (the night of the 25th), the Prince said that since then, the War Minister was very angry and was saying such things as: "We won't put up a War Minister."

The Governor-General of Formosa came over on the 25th. We conversed about various matters concerning the administration of Formosa. He talked about rice monopoly, but said: "The situation at present is very agitated. I shall talk to the Premier about it later on."

Many news reporters came and talked about various matters late on the night of the 25th. There was a great deal of

dissatisfaction over the fact that the Home Ministry had forbidden the press to publish news about the reorganization of the Cabinet. All sorts of arguments were being circulated. On one hand, it seemed as if KONOYE were very popular. At the same time, there were many who denounced KONOYE. Such was the situation, and I thought that it was important to clear matters up as soon as possible.

I (HARADA) phoned KIDO on the morning of the 26th. He said: "The matter (reorganization of the Cabinet) will probably be settled today. ARAKI will be Minister of Education, I will be Welfare Minister and the Home Minister will probably be SUETSUGU. ARAKI, as Minister of Education, is quite unconventional, but in any case, we will do whatever we can."

Saionji - Harada Memoirs

Chapter 276
(30 May 1938)

Ugaki Coaxed Into Cabinet

Translated by Miss Miwako Yanamoto

I (HARADA) thought that the situation was quite secure. I finished my own business in the morning. FUKUDA, the former Chief Secretary to Adm. OKADA, was in from Shanghai. I invited FUKUDA for noon and had lunch at the Kuwana with him and MATSUDAIRA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.

I (HARADA) had a phone call from KIDO around 1:00 o'clock. When I answered, he immediately said: "Did you suggest anything to UGAKI? We were faced with a 'deadlock'. Finally, UGAKI said: 'I do not think I am quite suitable for Foreign Minister. Of course, I think it would be all right if it were some other ministerial position. Since we cannot tell what the Army will do yet, please wait one or two days.' Consequently, IKEDA is hesitating, too. If matters cannot be settled by this evening, we will be forced to give up the Cabinet. We are in great trouble." Since he (KIDO) had said outright: "Did you suggest anything?", I replied: "Don't talk like a fool. Outside of talking to you, I haven't told anyone about how Prince SAIONJI feels. My desires are no different from yours in hoping that this matter will be settled today. What are you saying?" I was a little angry at KIDO. KIDO said: "If that's the case, please do something." I cut the phone after I replied: "All right. I shall try my utmost so wait awhile."

Since I (HARADA) couldn't go flying off myself, I first phoned YUKI. YUKI had already gone to talk to IKEDA at the request of the Finance Minister. I phoned

RESTRICTED

and asked YAMASHITA, who was a good friend of UGAKI, to come over. In the meantime, I phoned UGAKI and inquired: "Just what have you done?" He replied: "I haven't done anything. I only wanted them to wait two or three days. How can I accept when we cannot discern the true situation of the Army? Further, I said: 'I think that I am a little unsuitable as Foreign Minister, but it would be all right if it were some other ministerial post, for instance, Minister of Overseas Affairs....'" I (HARADA) said: "KIDO just phoned and said that KONOYE is very worried. If you do not give your answer by this evening, the Cabinet will collapse. They seem to intend throwing it out. In that case, you will have to bear full responsibility for the Cabinet's collapse. KONOYE and KIDO's reputations will be harmed. Therein lies Prince SAIONJI's statement: 'I don't want his (UGAKI's) reputation to be hurt.' He is hoping that you won't be fatally wounded such as having to bear the full responsibility for this entanglement. Putting all things aside, you must accept today. It doesn't matter if the Cabinet falls tomorrow. I think the important thing is for you to accept. Even if this Cabinet should collapse, I do not think that political power will go to you immediately or that you will receive an Imperial Command (to form the next Cabinet). Regardless of whether it's for your sake or not, we must avoid confusion for the sake of the nation in internal administration when Japan is at present confronted by China and is looked upon with disfavor by leading nations. It is not a question of two or three days. I ask that you accept immediately." He said: "I understand. But I still think I can wait two or

three days." He ended his telephone conversation like that and it worried me. I asked YAMASHITA, a political correspondent, whom I didn't know very well to go to UGAKI's place inconspicuously after I had fully explained the situation to request that he (UGAKI) accept without delay.

While YAMASHITA was gone to UGAKI's place, KIDO phoned me again. KIDO said: "A lot of news is coming into the Police Bureau from the different regions. Extras are being put out everywhere. There is much popular acclaim (of the reorganization of the Cabinet). Stocks have gone up very high. If anything happens to upset the situation at this time, it will create a very serious panic. The financial world must be careful of a panic. Won't you please explain these facts further (to UGAKI)?" I called YAMASHITA by phone and had him relay that message to UGAKI.

YUKI came to my place after that, and he was also very worried. He told me that the situation was such and such...., an went home. YAMASHITA came back around 4;30. He immediately said: "I succeeded with the spiritual aid of Emperor MEIJI. I thought this was a very important tas and I worshipped at Meiji Shrine before going to UGAKI's place. He (UGAKI) said in a soldierly manner: 'Putting everything aside, I shall help KONOYE and offer my service (to the Emperor).' He expressed his determination and asked me to relay this to KIDO." YAMASHITA was very happy.

I (HARADA) phoned KIDO immediately. I said: "It's done." KIDO was very happy and passed this news on to KONOYE. He also phoned the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal

and President YUKI. In the meantime, I phoned IKEDA and talked to him. I found out that it would take two or three days before ITAGAKI arrived to take his post as War Minister. Even if he did not take it, it would still take that many days before the matter was validated. IKEDA and UGAKI had talked to Premier KONOYE and had asked him to wait those two or three days. Premier KONOYE had agreed to that. KIDO was the only one who didn't know about it. At any rate, KIDO thought the political situation was in a crisis and was impetuous. If KONOYE had just said to KIDO: "It's all right to wait one or two days," and had told him about giving his consent, I thought later that there might have been some other way to have handled the matter.

I (HARADA) told this to KIDO later by phone. KIDO said: "I have heard nothing like that from KONOYE. If I had heard about it, we might have handled the matter by having KONOYE urge them anew directly...." The situation had been in confusion, but it finally calmed down. The Premier visited the Palace before 6:00 o'clock to make an informal report. At a little past seven, the investiture of the two men was completed. UGAKI became Foreign Minister and IKEDA held two posts as Minister of Commerce and Industry and also of Finance. The event was popularly acclaimed and this reorganization effected a good influence both within and without the country.

I (HARADA) went to KIDO's home for dinner that night for the Juichinichi-kai (11th Day Society). From here, I left for Okitsu. On the morning of the 27th, I went to Prince SAIONJI's place. I gave Prince SAIONJI a complete report. Prince SAIONJI was very satisfied. He said:

"That was very good. Please give my best regards to KONOYE and KIDO. Please ask UGAKI to help KONOYE even more and exert himself for the sake of the nation. Please give my best regards to the other Cabinet members." After this, I returned.

After I (HARADA) came home, I told KIDO about this immediately. At ten the next day, I met UGAKI. UGAKI and I discussed various matters. UGAKI was quite satisfied and expressed his thoughts saying: "I am worried because public estimation is too high, but.... Please give my best regards to Prince SAIONJI."

At noon on the 28th, I (HARADA) went to KONOYE's home at Ogikubo for lunch. KAWARADA was also there and the three of us conversed leisurely during lunch. Someone mentioned: "How about having TAKI resign as the President of the Planning Office and have him imperially nominated (for the House of Peers) soon? Also, how about having FUNADA, the Chief of the Legislation Bureau, resign, and bring in HIGAI as his successor?" After lunch, I went with KONOYE to the Koganei Golf Club and returned home in the evening.

I (HARADA) was finally moving to Sendagaya on the 29th. We began our first day of moving. The day was Sunday and nothing much happened. Each person I met said: "Nothing has ever succeeded as well as this reorganization (of the Cabinet)," and they were all happy.

Saionji - Harada Memoirs

Chapter 277
(6 June 1938)

Emperor Urges Coordination

Translated by Miss Miwako Yanamoto

MATSUDAIRA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, came and said: "This is really secret. Yesterday the Emperor laughingly told the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal: 'The other day after the re-organization (of the Cabinet), I (Emperor) asked KONOYE: 'What about the Home Ministry? There are various comments made about Home Minister SUETSUGU but what about them?' KONOYE replied: 'On the whole, his reputation isn't very bad. If anyone speaks ill of him, it's probably only the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.'" The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal told me this with a forced smile."

I (HARADA) went to the Foreign Ministry and met Minister UGAKI at ten in the morning of the 29th. UGAKI said: "I think that I shall study things for a while. I have told the Vice-Minister: 'I may change the Vice-Minister in the future, but I want you to continue for the time being.' There are some people who come to me trying to push SHIRATORI. I told them: 'Even if I thought SHIRATORI was good and wanted to make him Vice-Minister, if you suggest the matter in this manner, how can I carry it through even if it is good?', and sent them away. Since then, they have kept quiet."

I (HARADA) met KONOYE on the 30th. KONOYE said: "The Emperor is a little too fastidious. I wish he were a little more broad-minded. I wonder if it's because a narrow-minded person like the present Lord Keeper of the

RESTRICTED

Privy Seal is with him?" I (HARADA) replied: "I don't see any objections to the Emperor being fastidious. I think that he is more exalted because he is fastidious." I thought to myself that I didn't want him to speak too ill of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.

On the 31st, I (HARADA) visited former Foreign Minister HIROTA and YOSHINO, the former Minister of Commerce and Industry to pay my respects. Since HIROTA was at home, we met leisurely. He talked about the very difficult circumstances of foreign relations. Further, he said: "Whether it concerns the British, American, Chinese or any problem, the very first step for the new Minister is to do something - it doesn't matter what - that will be favorable to Britain and the United States and gain their confidence. After this has been done, he must handle China together with them. I have resigned, but these are important times. I shall watch the transitions of the times very closely and shall also study them." YOSHINO was not at home, and I didn't see him.

On the afternoon of the 1st, I (HARADA) went to Yokosuka. In accordance with a promise made previously with HASEGAWA, the Commander-in-Chief of Yokosuka Naval Base, and HARA, the Commander of the Air Depot, I went by auto together with Marquis INOUYE and Marquis MATSUDAIRA to Taura. We inspected the air depot. Its scale was larger than I had expected. The site itself was about 300,000 tsubo (245 acres). It was established upon a very scientific basis. The various sections were well unified and gave one a feeling of strength. When you look at each section, there are still many points which are somewhat deficient and it appears very crude.

I think the reason for this is a lack of money. I felt that manpower was very sufficient. In the evening, we were invited to the official residence of the Commander-in-Chief (HASEGAWA). We had dinner at the Komatsu and spent the night in pleasant conversation. I returned to Tokyo late.

On the 2nd, I (HARADA) met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. We conversed about various matters. The Emperor's health has been very good lately. After the reorganization (of the Cabinet), he again goes to his laboratory.

At noon, I (HARADA) was invited by the British Ambassador. I had lunch at the British Embassy and I returned around 3:00 o'clock after a friendly chat.

On the 3rd, I (HARADA) visited Welfare Minister KIDO and talked to him. He seemed calm for the first time in a long while and appeared very lighthearted. He said: "I have nothing in particular to tell you. Please give my regards to Prince SAIONJI." That same day I (HARADA) met Navy Minister YONAI but nothing very important was discussed.

I (HARADA) met KONOYE at the Premier's official residence around noon on the 3rd. He said: "ITAGAKI reached Tokyo last night. I intend to talk to him today as we lunch. HIROTA and I talked too strongly about overthrowing CHIANG's political powers. In order to change our foreign policy, I think that I shall resign and ask UGAKI to carry on. I told UGAKI the other day: 'Don't say too publicly that we won't have anything to do with CHIANG's administrative powers.' ITAGAKI's investiture will be over around 3:00 o'clock. When I

Restricted Classification
Removed Per
Executive Order 10501

went to the Palace today for an audience, it was the Emperor's wish. 'It has been decided to attack Anking on June 10. Please relay this to the Foreign Minister and the Finance Minister.' I immediately gave my secretary letters to take to both Ministers."

I (HARADA) departed on the night of the 3rd and stayed over at Yugawara. In the morning of the 4th, I saw Prince SAIONJI. I returned after making a detailed report. Prince SAIONJI seemed to be in very good spirits.

The morning of the 5th was the first morning since moving to Sen[illegible]gawa. MATSUDAIRA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, came and said: "This also is, of course, secret. The Emperor laughingly told the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal: 'KONOYE said this about ITAGAKI: 'I met him, but he is a good-for-nothing.' He (Emperor) added: 'KONOYE certainly changes his mind fast.'" I (HARADA) think the following is what KONOYE told MATSUDAIRA. It seems that the other day before UMEZU departed as Army Commander, he met KONOYE and had quite a long talk with him. After that, KONOYE disclosed: "UMEZU is a pretty reliable man. I wish I had met him much earlier." I (HARADA) had often told him over and over again that UMEZU was an extremely trustworthy character. KONOYE had always replied: "I could never get along with someone like UMEZU." KIDO, too, had been the same way. If UMEZU's name was mentioned, he would unsparingly flay him: "He is a dangerous and offensive person." Thinking it over now, I thought it very regrettable that they had been influenced by slander coming from somewhere.

After the resignation of SUGIYAMA was decided,

he had an audience with the Emperor before leaving his official post. At that time, he didn't have a word of complaint. The Emperor told the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal: "SUGIYAMA's attitude was commendable." That is to say, the Emperor said to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal: "SUGIYAMA didn't say a word." From these many statements of the Emperor, I thought that even if KONOYE were to speak wilfully due to his friendship with the Emperor, the Emperor would never follow anything that was not according to reason. I felt that it was a matter to be grateful for.

On the morning of the 8th, I (HARADA) met MATSUDAIRA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. He said: "I am wondering whether it wouldn't be better for the Foreign Minister to request an audience with the Emperor occasionally to report on foreign policy matters, whether large or small. For example, United States' reply concerning the problem of American rights and interests (in China) was made public by the press. The Foreign Minister had not reported anything about it and for that reason it seemed as if the Emperor somehow wanted to hear about it directly."

I (HARADA) phoned Foreign Minister UGAKI and said: "In times like these, the Foreign Minister should seek an audience with the Emperor from time to time. There is a need to report changes in the state of affairs continuously. I wonder if it isn't necessary for the Foreign Minister and Finance Minister to request frequent audiences with the Emperor and report directly on various matters concerning foreign policies and finance, especially in the present situation. I heard from court

officials close to the Emperor, that it seemed as if he were waiting for your visit to the Palace regarding the American problem. That is why I am telling you this." Foreign Minister UGAKI replied: "I am very grateful for that. I shall make a special effort to do so." It seemed as if the Foreign Minister had been hesitant.

The Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal (MATSUDAIRA) further stated: "The Emperor said: 'KONOYE came the other day and said: 'I would like to guide the war to an end as soon as possible.' But today, the Chief of General Staff came and said: 'We will attack Hankow to the end.' One group says they want to end the war, and another says they will even attack Hankow. It is very deplorable that there is no liaison between them. Shall I call KONOYE and ask him: 'Isn't there a possibility of holding a liaison conference or something?' In reply to his (Emperor's) query, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal said: 'I think you are justified to summon the Premier. The Premier visited the Palace in the evening after receiving his summons. In reply to the Emperor's inquiries as above, he (KONOYE) replied: 'Instead of a liaison conference, I would like to hold a conference of five ministers and settle matters gradually.'"

On the 8th, I (HARADA) visited the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at his office. I inquired directly into various matters. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal said: "It is a fact that the Emperor did not participate in this previous change in War Minister. At that time, he summoned Prince KAN-IN, the Chief of the General Staff, regarding the situation. He reprimanded him severely for the Chief of the General Staff's interference in

personnel matters. The Emperor's attitude was truly magnificent." The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was also worried and said: "I'm afraid that it looks as if Premier KONOYE wants to run away (resign) sometime."

On the morning of the 9th, I (HARADA), visited the Navy Minister at his official residence. We talked about matters arising since the last time we met. I told him that the opinions reported to the Emperor by the Chief of the General Staff (Prince KAN-IN) and Premier KONOYE were entirely opposite. The Navy Minister stated: "I think that the Operations Bureau should proceed in that manner in the present incident. As for the Premier, if he plans for some change in foreign policy and the matter is settled, the causes of the war will disappear and that is also good. The statements aren't particularly contradictory. Their ways are just different. If the Army and Navy were to proceed by strongly adhering to their present attitude and the foreign policy was to stabilize our position, I don't see anything contradictory."

On the way home, I (HARADA) visited Welfare Minister YUDO. He said: "There is no particular change. However, it is unpleasant that the feelings between the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and KONOYE are becoming increasingly distant. This is a recent example. Since former Foreign Minister HIROTA was drawn out by special efforts to become Foreign Minister immediately after he had resigned as Premier, and it was his second service, the Premier wanted to request the Emperor to grant special privileges of the former post as Premier to him (HIROTA). KONOYE related this desire to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal wouldn't listen to it and

said: 'I cannot do anything that is against my conscience. Since HIROTA, the former Foreign Minister, has just served as a Minister of State, that is, as Foreign Minister, I think that the special privileges to be granted him should be that of his former post as a Minister of State.' From the Premier's viewpoint, he thought it only proper that he (HIROTA) be granted special privileges of his former post as Premier since he had been dragged out against his will as Foreign Minister and had previously been Premier and also Foreign Minister before that. In the light of the future, when men of Premier calibre are so few, there was also added political consideration that it would be very useful in settling political problems if HIROTA, the former Foreign Minister, were in possession of special privileges granted in accordance with his former post of Premier. With these thoughts in mind, the Premier negotiated with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal but without success. The matter finally ended with the granting of special privileges of his former post as Minister of State (to HIROTA)."

On the night of the 9th, Premier KONOYE invited KOBAYASHI, the Governor-General of Formosa, Navy Minister YONAI and Adm. OSUMI in addition to his reception for Vice-Admiral HASEGAWA to the Koryu. He asked me to come. I went and everyone was very happy. We talked until quite late. On the way home, Premier KONOYE took me to Sendagaya in his car. He stopped off at my place and we talked about various matters. The Premier repeatedly said: "The problem of granting special privileges of the former post turned out very deplorably for Foreign Minister HIROTA. It's really difficult to talk to

YUASA, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. You do not have such a good feeling toward IZAWA. However, it's easier for me to talk to IZAWA."

Saionji - Harada Memoirs

Chapter 278
(20 June 1938)

Itagaki Wants Shiratori

Translated by Miss Miwako Yanamoto

On the 13th, I (HARADA) went to Okitsu. I made a report of various matters up to the present. Regarding the problem of granting special privileges of the former post of Premier to HIROTA, the former Foreign Minister, his opinion was the same as that of KONOYE. He (SAIONJI) said: "They should have asked that he be granted special privileges of a Premier. It is foolish to determine such things by tradition or the number of years served. As long as the Emperor stated that he had the qualification and appointed him as a Minister of State even for a day, such things like the period or length of time have no bearing, and it's strange to think that they have."

On the night of the 13th, I (HARADA) returned to Tokyo. On the morning of the 15th, I met MATSUDAIRA. MATSUDAIRA said: "It is the Emperor's wish to have Finance Minister IKEDA talk to him about finance before the Grand Imperial Headquarters meeting which is to be held soon. The Finance Minister hasn't visited the Emperor once yet. Furthermore, when America sent her reply (regarding her interests in China), it appeared in the newspapers, but Foreign Minister UGAKI did not make a personal report to the Emperor. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal said: 'I think the Emperor is very anxiously awaiting the personal report.' He (Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal) was worried about the matter. Can't something be done?"

I (HARADA) immediately phoned Finance Minister IKEDA from MATSUDAIRA's place. He said: "I wanted very much to go to the Palace and talk to the Emperor. Unfortunately, a manservant employed in my home was suspected of carrying typhoid.

RESTRICTED

I inquired of the Imperial Household Ministry through my Secretary, but I cannot visit the Palace for about three weeks."

I (HARADA) called Foreign Minister UGAKI. He said: "I shall do my best to arrange matters so that I can report to the Emperor." Ever since his assumption of the post, it seems he has studied various matters concerning foreign policies and was getting prepared.

Before I (HARADA) made these phone calls, I called KONOYE from MATSUDAIRA's place and told him about the situation. He said: "Please urge the two Ministers by phone." Since I received the above answers when I phoned, I again called KONOYE and transmitted the replies. Regarding Finance Minister IKEDA, he (KONOYE) said: "KIDO knows more about finance than I do. I'll have KIDO get the facts from the Finance Minister in my stead and make the report to the Emperor. Please phone KIDO and ask him to do this for me." I phoned KIDO and told him about it. He replied: "That would be distressing to me. I think it best for the Premier to talk to the Emperor." I cut the phone after I said: "Please talk that over with KONOYE." That afternoon, it was finally decided that KONOYE would get the facts on finance from the Finance Minister and report to the Emperor and he (KONOYE) visited the Palace.

One morning after that, I went to meet Navy Minister YONAI. The Minister said: "No matter what is decided at the meeting of the Grand Imperial Headquarters, if strategical operations and finance do not concur favorably, we will have to settle the matter by changing strategical operations and adjust the difference. Even if matters are decided one way at Grand Imperial Headquarters, in view of strategical

operations, there is always room for changes if finance won't permit those plans."

On the 16th, I (HARADA) met NAGAI, the Minister of Communications, on personal business. He was very happy about the fact that Foreign Minister UGAKI had joined the Cabinet. He said: "It is very difficult to control the confusion in the Seiyukai. I am wondering if the Seiyukai won't calm down when UGAKI becomes Premier sometime in the future."

That afternoon, I (HARADA) met KONOYE at the Premier's official residence. He said: "This noon Foreign Minister UGAKI, Finance Minister IKEDA and I held a so-called meeting of three Ministers while we had lunch. War Minister ITAGAKI persisted in recommending SHIRATORI as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs to UGAKI. When ITAGAKI was at the front and SHIRATORI made his rounds of North and Central China, they talked for about four hours on various matters. It is said their opinions on foreign relations coincided very well. The ones who would hinder UGAKI most would be the field grade officers of the Army. If UGAKI wants to carry out some foreign policy matter, he will have to hold them down and yet let it appear that he is cooperating with them. Otherwise, he won't be able to accomplish anything. SHIRATORI is not considered highly by his seniors in the Foreign Ministry, and his reputation outside of the Ministry is somewhat bad. However, if UGAKI were to use him, he would probably handle him appropriately. I think that using SHIRATORI would be very good politically. However the Navy is definitely opposed to him. Vice Minister YAMAMOTO especially, says that in view of SHIRATORI's moral character: 'We cannot appoint such a man for official disciplinary reasons.' However, can't something be done on this occasion without saying such strait-laced things? I

will not assume any responsibility and recommend SHIRATORI against their will. However, I still think that SHIRATORI would probably be the best (for the position of Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs). UGAKI told me today: 'I heard that SHIRATORI is very 'loose' with his finance. If he's acceptable to the Army, he isn't to the Navy. This is a very distressing situation."

KONOYE said further: "MATSUOKA says: 'I am going to resign from the South Manchurian Railways (as President).' I intend to bring in TATEKAWA as successor to MATSUOKA. MATSUOKA also says: 'I would like to go to America as Ambassador.'" I (HARADA) thought this was alarming, but I didn't forcefully oppose the matter there. I (HARADA) said: "MATSUOKA and his group have difficulty dealing with SHIRATORI, and SHIRATORI does not get along with IWANAGA either, but for some reason or other, MATSUOKA and IWANAGA get along well. For that reason, there will be instances when SHIRATORI will be useful. If he were placed in a position of responsibility, wouldn't he pull himself together and improve? If UGAKI doesn't do something, UGAKI will become increasingly unpopular. To take in SHIRATORI, might in a sense, somewhat comply with expectations. It is acknowledged that SHIRATORI can handle the job best. His failing is that he digresses from time to time. It'll be all right as long as UGAKI keeps that point well in mind so....Would you like me to find out about the situation in the Navy?" He (KONOYE) replied: "Would you please?"

That very evening the Navy Minister, Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO and I (HARADA) met at the Navy Minister's official residence. We discussed this matter (re SHIRATORI). Vice Minister YAMAMOTO said: "Navy tradition will not permit the

Navy to interfere in the personnel of sections outside of the Navy. It is another matter for the Navy Minister to speak up as a Minister of State. However, it would be very distressing if a Vice Minister like myself were thought to be making remarks about outside personnel. By chance, I happen to know something about SHIRATORI's moral conduct. (An incident in which SHIRATORI was involved with a typist working under him.) I wouldn't think it was serious if it hadn't been someone under his supervision. However, the fact that he was involved with someone under his supervision is something which I think cannot be pardoned from an official disciplinary standpoint. If the Premier and the Foreign Minister feel it necessary, due to political reasons, to make SHIRATORI a Vice Minister, not one person in the Imperial Navy will interfere, speak ill of or expose SHIRATORI's failings to anyone. Where work is concerned, we will collaborate well, cooperate, and will also fight squarely when our opinions differ. Where work is involved, I will not mix emotions and let them enter my thoughts. I would like to have you explain that point clearly to the Premier and to Minister UGAKI."

I (HARADA) also told them about the fact that MATSUOKA was resigning as President of the South Manchurian Railways and had promised the position to TATEKAWA. Both the Minister and Vice Minister said: "That is very bad," and were worried.

As soon as I (HARADA) reached home, I phoned Premier KONOYE and clearly told him these facts. Premier KONOYE rejoiced. Vice Minister YAMAMOTO had said: "Please tell him that I (YAMAMOTO) said: 'I think that is a very liberal stand for the Premier to take.'" When I told this to KONOYE he laughed over the phone. In accordance with KONOYE's request I (HARADA) also told Foreign Minister UGAKI about this, and I made that point especially clear.

Itagaki Wants Shiratori

Early on the morning of the 18th, I (HARADA) went to the official residence of the Navy Vice Minister. I reported to Vice Minister YAMAMOTO: "I told your story in detail to the Premier and the Foreign Minister last night." On the way home, I stopped at KIDO's place. I told KIDO the complete story.

I (HARADA) think Vice Minister YAMAMOTO mentioned this in his conversation. The words: "The Army should attend to their own duties and return to the drill grounds," is very much the rage in Army circles recently. Some Army men of Captain's rank at the War College were even dissatisfied with the teaching methods of the school. The Army should refrain from anything that resembles deliberation, and they should not interfere with political activities. To put it in other words, if the Army doesn't concentrate on military matters, the Army will become increasingly weak. The situation is becoming so that the young men who are worrying (about the future of the Army) must ride on the general trend of affairs. The present War Minister, of course, felt that the Army should concentrate on military affairs. IMAMURA, the Military Affairs Section Chief, and others, were also maintaining this strongly. According to what I (HARADA) hear, it is said: "Almost all the members of the General Staff Headquarters are beginning to feel that way."

The other day, a Colonel came to Finance Minister, IKEDA's place and made various statements. He (IKEDA) told him: "You may say that. However, the new War Minister agrees with us and his opinion is the opposite of yours." That Colonel replied: "If that's the case, I won't say anything more. If the Minister (War) is of that opinion, we have nothing to say." Hearing this from IKEDA, one can see that there is such an

RESTRICTED

atmosphere (of bowing to the opinion of a superior).

On th. morning of the 19th, I (HARADA) visited Finance Minister IKEDA at Oiso. At KIDO's place, I had told him about the story that TATEKAWA was to become the successor to MATSUOKA, as President of the South Manchurian Railways. KIDO had said: "Please tell IKEDA about it and ask him to stop it." When I told IKEDA about it, he said: "That is a preposterous story. It will have a very bad effect on the finance world. I shall stop it somehow." I told him what I had heard from the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and about the Navy and went home.

When I was on the train going to Oiso, IWANAGA was also on with two young Britishers, KETTICK (?) and Chancellor (?) of Jordine Mathieson about whom I had previously received a telegram from MUNAKATA of Shanghai. These two were sons of managers of the Jewish financial clique in Shanghai. It was said: "They have come to Japan to appeal about various matters and to find out about the situation in Japan. In a certain sense, they have come to talk with the Japanese people with good intentions. Japan should, therefore, welcome them and talk with them leisurely as much as possible." IWANAGA had been asked to do this, and he said: "I am taking them to Fujiya Hotel and shall talk to them leisurely." He was on his way with them. When I (HARADA) looked, I saw many Kempei in plainclothes and detectives in plainclothes from the Metropolitan Police Board nearby. I thought it was unfortunate and told Finance Minister IKEDA about it right away. IKEDA said: "It would be distressing if anything unpleasant should happen to hurt their feelings when we are thinking of using them. I shall immediately call my secretary and caution the Police Bureau of the Home Ministry and the Metropolitan Police Board." I (HARADA) think this was carried out. I was

RESTRICTED

greatly surprised that the methods of the Metropolitan Police Board and Police Bureau seem to indicate that they do not know the intentions of the statesmen.

RESTRICTED

Saionji - Harada Memoirs

Chapter 279
(27 June 1938)

Plans for Diplomatic Shifts

Translated by Miss Miwako Yanamoto

Early on the morning of the 21st, I (HARADA) called on the Navy Vice Minister. I told him about recent happenings. I said: "Finance Minister IKEDA may go to Yokosuka tomorrow with the Premier to inspect the air depot."

In the afternoon, I (HARADA) happened to meet the Premier at his official residence. He said: "ITAGAKI is rather easily excited." KONOYE was concerned and said: "This is a problem concerning the Ambassador to Germany. When Vice Admiral GODO went to Berlin as the national representative, he began to exert himself in behalf of a Japan-German economic treaty. Maj. Gen. OSHIMA was participating in this, of course. In the midst of negotiations, Ambassador TOGO took the problem over himself since it was a part of foreign policy. This became a source of complaint to the Army and Vice Admiral GODO. Lately, they have begun to say: 'Please change TOGO.' General Staff Headquarters secretly wants to make OSHIMA, who is the Military Attache at the Embassy, the Ambassador. As I told you before, OTT, the German Military Attache residing in Tokyo, was promoted to Ambassador to Japan. The Army wants to do the same and make Maj. Gen. OSHIMA an Ambassador. War Minister ITAGAKI broached the matter to Foreign Minister UGAKI. However, it cannot be done so suddenly. Foreign Minister UGAKI has other ideas, too. Since he hasn't been given a reply, ITAGAKI tells me: 'Foreign Minister UGAKI is slow in everything.'" At the same time, I (HARADA) heard that MATSUOKA would not resign as President of the South Manchurian Railways, although it was said previously that he would resign and that TATEKAWA would succeed him.

Early the next day, I (HARADA) again called on the Navy

RESTRICTED

Minister YONAI at his official residence. I said: "Yesterday I met the Premier. I hear that ITAGAKI, the new War Minister is full of complaints, saying that the methods of Foreign Minister UGAKI are slow. If their relationship is like that from the very beginning, it is very bad. From your experience as Navy Minister, won't you speak to War Minister ITAGAKI, who comes from the same prefecture and say something like: 'Politics and foreign affairs cannot be handled as simply or as quickly as military men think they can. Political affairs must be handled calmly.' Won't you try to explain matters to him so that he will calm down somewhat?" The Navy Minister replied "You are absolutely right. I shall indirectly caution him soon."

I (HARADA) also told the Navy Minister what I had heard from Imperial Household Minister MATSUDAIRA, when I spoke to him over the phone a little while ago. The Imperial Household Minister said: "The Emperor is going either to Hayama or Nasuno this summer. It would be distressing if the rightists or the young officers were to make complaints about this or if something annoying should come up from various directions. We are sending feelers out to find out what the situation is." I thought it was a good idea to be discreet, but that an excess was foolish. When I (HARADA) spoke to the Navy Minister he said: "It is only natural for the Emperor to go to Hayama or Nasuno, and there is no need for comment. The government should encourage him (Emperor) without reserve, and why not hasten the matter?" Properly speaking, I thought it best for the Premier to urge the Emperor and I told the Premier about the matter over the phone.

That afternoon, I (HARADA) met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at the Palace. I told him about the recent situation

The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal had more or less calmed down. The Emperor's health was very good, but he was worried about Prince SAIONJI's health. I said: "He is in very good spirits" and told him about how Prince SAIONJI was getting along.

In the afternoon of that day, (22nd), I (HARADA) went to Okitsu. On the morning of the 23rd, I saw Prince SAIONJI. I returned to Tokyo in the afternoon. From 8:30 pm, I went to Prince CHICHIBU's place and talked to him about two hours. On the morning of the 24th, I (HARADA) visited Finance Minister IKEDA at his private home. He said: "Yesterday, I went to the Palace and talked to the Emperor about various problems concerning international revenue and expenditures, the problem of supply and demand of goods, and also about the problem concerning newspaper firms. The newspaper firms were especially amorous about the limit on paper. The presidents of these firms all came together to petition me. I asked: 'Are you making complaints against the national policy?' They replied: 'We would never complain about the national policy,' and went away. I told the Emperor about this, and he laughed heartily. I talked with him without reserve about various matters and then withdrew."

Yesterday Premier KONOYE went to the air depot at Yokosuka for inspection. He returned and said happily: "I learned a great deal."

I (HARADA) met KIDO some time later. There was nothing in particular. He said: "I (KIDO) am opposed to anything like a conference set up to deal with internal affairs. I think it would be better to handle matters with a plan like national mobilization. I have relayed this to the Premier."

After the Cabinet meeting on the 24th, OTANI, the Minister of Overseas Affairs, resigned to become president of a

North China Company. It was decided that UGAKI, the new Foreign Minister, would take on the additional post of Minister of Overseas Affairs. It was made public on that evening.

On the morning of the 28th, I (HARADA) was leaving for Karuizawa with my family for an overnight stay. Therefore, I phoned KONOYE on the 24th, but there was nothing very important at the moment. From the 25th until the night of the 26th, I (HARADA) stayed at Karuizawa and then returned. That evening's paper mentioned that the Home Minister had asked the Vice Minister to resign. He not only changed the Vice Minister, but also the Chief of the Police Bureau. He appointed TACHI, the Governor of Tokyo Prefecture, as Vice Minister of Home Affairs, and HOMMA, the Governor of Akita Prefecture, as the Chief of the Police Bureau. The previous two in these posts withdrew. The fact that he (Home Minister) resolutely changed the Vice Minister of Home Affairs and the Chief of the Police Bureau whom he had brought in with him (when he assumed the post as Home Minister) steadied the minds of the people in the present situation and further improved the atmosphere in official circles.

On the night of the 27th, Prince CHICHIBU and Prince TAKAMATSU were coming to KONOYE's home in Ogikubo. The fact is that, at first, we were intending to join them. However, I thought that, in a certain sense, it might be better for the Premier to get together with the two Princes alone. I urged KONOYE and hinted to HOSOKAWA, KIDO and MATSUDAIRA and we all declined. There were certain preparations which had to be made, and I went to KONOYE's house in Nagata-cho and talked to Mrs. KONOYE.

MUNAKATA had returned from China and that noon MUNAKATA, MATSUDAIRA and I (HARADA) had lunch at the Tokiwa in Marunouchi.

We asked about conditions in Shanghai. The Army had finally approved of the Army and Foreign Ministry officials in China and the Central Government (in Tokyo) working together to influence England to Japan's side. NUNAKATA had come to make the preliminary arrangements for that. We asked about various matters and talked till around 2 o'clock. He said: "Conditions in Shanghai will improve gradually. Also, TANI will be coming to Tokyo soon."

In the evening, I (HARADA) went to the meeting of the Nijuhichinichi-kai (27th Day Society). I met TANI at the Yamaguchi (name of inn). I left him after we made a promise to meet at my home the next morning. Then I (HARADA) attended the meeting of KIDO's Juichinichikai (11th Day Society) and returned home late. The next morning, I was waiting for TANI to come. He phoned to say: "Prince KAN-IN, the Chief of the General Staff, says: 'Come this morning.' Therefore, I cannot go to your place. Let's make it soon some other time."

Matters had been in confusion for some time now about the problem of the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and ambassadors. Many persons were worried and were saying: "Isn't Foreign Minister UGAKI somewhat bewildered?" I (HARADA) thought it over a bit and thought perhaps that it might be best if SAITO, the Ambassador to the U.S., were appointed Vice Minister and that it would be a most suitable appointment to put in Admiral NOMURA as a successor to his post. I immediately called Minister UGAKI on the phone to tell him about this. He replied: "I think that is an excellent idea. In fact, it has been in my mind from before. I shall think it over some more." I (HARADA) also told KONOYE about my idea. KONOYE said: "I am very much in favor of that and would like to see it carried out." He also said: "I shall

talk to th Foreign Minister, too. However, won't you tell him beforehand that I approve of it?" I again phoned Minister UGAKI and said: "I told the Premier about it. The Premier said: 'I approve please tell him.' I am, therefore, lettin you know."

L t afternoon, I (HARADA) was invited to a launching ceremo at Uraga and Yokosuka. On the way home, I had dinner with the Commander-in-Chief, Vice Admiral HARA and others, and returned home late.

On the morning of the 29th, I (HARADA) went to the office (SUMITOMO) early. I was talking with OGURA about the Navy's connection with the problem of nationalizing electricity, especially about problems concerning Shikoku. Just then, I had a phone call from IWAKURA saying: "TANI has returned. We would like to have lunch with him right away together with several members of the Koseikai of the House of Peers to hear what he has to tell us. What do you think about it?" I immediately phoned TANI and asked him. Fortunately, he said: "I am free this noon." I asked KURODA, IWAKURA, FUKAO, ABO, ITO, T AGI and such people to come. We listened to the recent situation in Shanghai till around 3 o'clock. The three major problems that TANI spoke of were the declaration of war. revision of the Nine-Power Treaty, and the fact that we were saying we wouldn't have anything to do with CHIANG's Government.

The following is something which TANI maintained on his own: "Military action should be continued as far as Hankow. We should aid the new Government as much as we possible can and plan for its increase in power. We should cooperate with Great Brit in and the United States in regard to the administration of the Yangtze—that is, we should work together with

Restricted Classification Removed Per Executive Order 13526

Great Britain and the United States. To do these three things is very necessary. If we declare war (against China), we would be recognizing CHIANG's Government. After all, there is no such thing as a declaration of war unless the countries are on equal footing. The Nine-Power Treaty has, at present, increased its signatories to nineteen nations. If even one member should oppose, the revision of the Nine-Power Treaty cannot be carried out. In that case, if China opposed the revision, it could not be effected. China is represented by CHIANG's Government. Even if we suppose that China would approve the revision, it would still mean that we are recognizing CHIANG's Government. Therefore, if we were to bring up the matter of the revision of the Nine-Power Treaty, it would mean that we would be indirectly recognizing CHIANG's Government, and this result is undesirable." (Japan wanted a revision of the Nine-Power Treaty in order to justify the China Incident. Whether China approved of the revision or not, it would still mean that her vote counted as a nation on an equal basis. Since China was represented by CHIANG's Government, TANI thought it would be inadvisable to bring up the matter.) He (TANI) added: "However, I have not met the Premier yet. Therefore, please do not mention what I have just said. The powers are trying to weaken Japan. It is a fact that CHIANG Kai Shek is in a pretty bad spot right now. It would be enough to push him just once more. It would be distressing if matters were messed up when the matter is only halfway over. Authorities and officials in China (from Japan) have also said that England is gradually beginning to understand our position. At this time when England and the United States are becoming more friendly, there is need for caution on that point."

[redacted]

Plans for Diplomatic Shifts

After that, I (HARADA) immediately went to the official residence of the Premier. I asked about the meeting the Premier had with Prince CHICHIBU and Prince TAKAMATSU on the night of the 27th. He said: "The Princes were quite aware of various matters. They knew everything about the content of the Five Ministers' Conference." I (HARADA) said to Premier KONOYE: "The fact is that I forgot to tell you, but when I had an audience with Prince CHICHIBU some time ago, he said: 'The proposal for the Five Ministers' Conference is being worked out at the General Staff Headquarters in my section. It's really keeping me busy.' Since the problem is something which was planned in his section, naturally, he knows all about it." Premier KONOYE laughed too, when he heard this.

On the way home, I (HARADA) met the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet. He said: "The problem of asking SHIMOJO to resign as President of the Bureau of Decorations isn't going so smoothly. SHIMOJO went to his senior from the same prefecture, IZAWA, Takio to bewail the situation. IZAWA sent a messenger to KONOYE to say: 'The Presidency of the Bureau of Decorations has been an important position since Prince SAIONJI's time. It is outrageous to tamper and move an experienced and proficient man like SHIMOJO who holds that Presidency.' The matter is being counter-attacked." In the first place, IZAWA is a person who likes things to happen, and that attitude is truly undesirable. As for SHIMOJO, it is regrettable, but there is great criticism of his character. I (HARADA) had heard that it was the opinion and sentiment of everyone that anyone like him should be removed, in view of the feelings of those who receive decorations. I have thought the same thing too. The Chief Secretary of the Cabinet said:

RESTRICTED

"This is a really annoying and troublesome problem. I shall watch developments and leave it alone for a while."

That evening, I (HARADA) met the Navy Minister and Vice Minister of the Navy at the Navy Minister's official residence. The three of us talked for about an hour about various matters. I told them about the idea of appointing Ambassador SAITO as Vice Minister (of Foreign Affairs) and putting in Admiral NOMURA (as SAITO's successor). I told them that when I met MUSHAKOJI at the Imperial Household Ministry, he had said: "Wouldn't SAITO be suitable as Vice Minister (of Foreign Affairs)?" Thus, he seemed to be urging the matter (from his position in the Foreign Ministry). I (HARADA) also told the Navy Minister, for his information, about the visit of OKADA, Tadahiko yesterday. He (OKADA) talked as if he wanted something to happen and said: "Because UGAKI and IKEDA joined the Cabinet, the other Cabinet Ministers are looking rather poorly and have diminished in stature. That is why there is quite a bit of discontent among them. Regarding the recommandation of HIRANUMA (for Premiership), why wouldn't HIRANUMA be suitable when the Army settles down this time. HIRANUMA has said from before that he would come forth (as Premier) if only the Army were to restore order." He (OKADA) talked for a while also on the dispute of NAKAJIMA and HATOYAMA within the Seiyukai, making excuses for HATOYAMA. The reason I (HARADA) told all this to the Navy Minister is that War Minister ITAGAKI and the Navy Minister are on very good terms. If a group were going to try to overthrow the Cabinet, I am certain that they will try to irritate the Army. There is a very easy tendency that SHIONO (Minister of Justice) would irritate the War Minister. I explained the matter the best I could to the Navy Minister in the way of precaution.

Plans for Diplomatic Shifts

That same evening, there was a dinner party of SUMITOMO men at Kobiki-cho. I (HAMADA) went there and returned home late at night. It was decided that Minister TANI would give a general talk on foreign relations at the meeting of the State Councillors from 10 o'clock on the 30th. The afternoon of the same day (30th), he (TANI) was to meet the Premier and to report frankly on the recent state of foreign relations.

RESTRICTED

Saionji - Harada Memoirs

Chapter 280
(4 July 1938)

Various Proposals Aired

Translated by Miss Fumiko Segawa

On the 30th, about 5:00 pm, hearing that Premier KONOYE was laid up with a cold, I (HARADA) telephoned him. KONOYE told me: "Come over", so I called on him and had supper together with him. We talked till 9:30 pm. About 2 pm of that same day, Minister TANI had reported to the Premier. When I (HARADA) asked about TANI, the Premier remarked: "TANI is very aggressive." Then, the Premier talked about the time when the Imperial Princes came over. The Premier stated: "Since both of the Princes were fully aware of various matters, I complained a little about the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal." I (HARADA) thought to myself that that would never do.

KONOYE also told me: "KISHI, the secretary at my place, KAGESA from the Army and Captain OKA from the Navy dine together every week and talk on various matters. KISHI calls this gathering a meeting of the three ministers. KISHI told me: 'This is absolutely a secret, and I prefer that you (KONOYE) would not mention this to the War Minister until he (War Minister) mentions it to you', and stated the following: 'KAGESA will bring over KAO Tsung-wu, who, until recently, had been Chief of the Asia Bureau of the CHIANG Government, and confine him at the Kaikosha'. It appears that they both have arrived here already and are at the Kaikosha, but..... KISHI is saying incessantly: 'We would like to act in concert with the confinement of KAO Tsung-wu and devise a scheme in bringing about pease between China and Japan. Since no one knows about this, please keep it a secret.' Although the young officers in the Army devise such a scheme, it is quite impossible to be successful. CHIANG Kai Shek and practically all of his followers, namely the high government officials,

are graduates of the Military Academy in Ushigome, and are much indebted to AKIYAMA. AKIYAMA is a man with whom they have had friendly relations. Therefore, I think if a person like AKIYAMA would take actions instead of these young officers, the plan to bring about peace might be successful. However, this is a very difficult problem." To me (HARADA), it sounded like KONOYE was pushing the matter from one extreme to another. KONOYE also stated: "It seems that the Navy is not aware about KAO Tsung-wu." I (HARADA) thought to myself that the military was carrying out things which are distressing, but nothing can be done about it.

The following morning, I (HARADA) dropped in at KIDO's place and told him about the above matter and my conversation with KONOYE. KIDO said: "KONOYE should be very discreet when speaking ill about the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to the Princes." KONOYE does not think the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to be a bad person, but it seems that there is a friction of personalities between the two.

After talking with KIDO, I (HARADA) visited Finance Minister IKEDA at his private residence on my way back. I spoke to him about the Army, and Minister IKEDA stated: "I heard from someone that KAO Tsung-wu had been brought here. I'll warn them." I (HARADA) told the Minister: "KONOYE told me: 'I (KONOYE) mentioned the matter to UGAKI in short, but had no response'. Kindly advise UGAKI on this point." I entrusted everything in IKEDA's hands.

At noon, I (HARADA) had lunch together with MUNAKATA of the Bank of Japan, who returned from Shanghai. I heard his stories and MUNAKATA stated: "Japan should win over England and United States on the Yangtze River problem, and act in concert with both nations. It is very important to bring

Restricted Classification
Removed Per
Executive Order 10501

about a harmonious relation between England and Japan. MUNAKATA's aim is: "I returned to Japan to sell this idea to the Government. The Army and Navy in Shanghai are in accord with this idea. I would like to secure the collaboration of England on financial and economical problems. England is trying to come to an understanding with Japan, and the Japanese officials in China have come to Tokyo to obtain the understanding of the government on this matter. It is unusual for Japanese officials in China to take a strong attitude toward a problem whereas the Japanese Government in Tokyo would usually be weak-kneed on the matter. However, it is unusually extraordinary when the Japanese officials in China are taking a weak-kneed attitude and the government in Tokyo is taking a firm one on the matter."

That evening, my wife and I (HARADA) were invited to YADA Hichitaro's home. The Minister of the Imperial Household and MUSHAKOJI, the Director of the Bureau of Peerage and Heraldry and their wives were also there. The Minister of the Imperial Household seemed much concerned about the England problem.

On the 2nd, I (HARADA) met MUNAKATA just for a moment, and he stated: "If the matter will go satisfactorily, fine. However, there seems to be some obstacle, but somehow it will be settled."

That evening, I (HARADA) went over to the Navy Minister's and conversed with the Navy Minister and Vice Minister for approximately 2 hours. OKAWA brought a petition from the young officials of the Foreign Ministry to UGAKI, the Foreign Minister, which stated: "Appoint SHIRATORI the Vice Minister." I (HARADA) heard that certain quarters are saying: "Should ITAGAKI and OKAWA collaborate, it will be harmful to the Army."

Therefore, I (HARADA) said: "Such a person as OKAWA should be checked so that he cannot be too obtrusive." The other is that there are certain quarters that are repeatedly instilling in to the militarists, who know nothing about finance and economics, an optimistic view on finance, in order to camouflage the straitened circumstances of national economy and are agitating for war with Soviet Russia. Since it is a very critical matter, I (HARADA) explained it clearly to the Minister and Vice Minister. Although I (HARADA) was unable to quote what KONOYE told me regarding the China problem, I said, as TANI had stated before: "As long as the greater majority have decided to push the matter through, it must be carried out outwardly in such a manner. Nevertheless, in the background, there are signs in various quarters to the effect that they are working toward the opposite. As a result, it might result in something serious. Therefore, every precaution must be taken." I (HARADA) also mentioned the meeting of KISHI, KAGESA of the Army, and OKA of the Navy, which I heard from KONOYE. Then, Vice Minister YAMAMOTO told me: "I (Vice Minister) am responsible for OKA's participation in this meeting. I told him to attend it and hear what they discuss. Don't worry, for I am the one that sent him there, (to keep an eye on KISHI and KAGESA)." We then talked on various subjects. I (HARADA) especially asked the Navy Minister: "Will you explain clearly to ITAGAKI, the reason why it is unfavorable for him to associate closely with such persons as OKAWA Shumei."

In the afternoon of the 3rd, (Sunday), AOKI, the Assistant Director of the Planning Department came over and repeatedly said: "This is an awkward position", because of the ill-feeling existing in the KONOYE Cabinet, especially among those around

[redacted]

the Premier, toward the bureaucrats, AOKI stated: "Administrative affairs are progressing very slowly. It isn't necessary for KONOYE to flatter the bureaucrats, but should keep the bureaucrats happy, although it is to his disadvantage. The present condition is very distressing."

S[illegible]KAZANI, Kiichi, who returned from North China came over then and said: "This Sino-Japanese War should be put to an end as soon as possible. I wish someone will be bold enough to say: 'The war should end immediately.' I intend to mention this to the War Minister. I have already mentioned this to the Army Commander in Manchuria."

In the evening, Admiral NOMURA came over and stated: "I understand that I (NOMURA) will be recommended as Ambassador to the United States. However, I am incapable. Since I am now working at the Peers' School, I would like to put my whole heart in this work. I think someone from the Foreign Ministry would be more suitable for this position as Ambassador to the United States." NOMURA left after chatting for a while.

Saionji - Harada Memoirs

Chapter 281
(14 July 1938)

Navy Officers Complain

Translated by Miss Mariko Segawa

On the 4th, I (HARADA) met Private Secretary MATSUDAIRA and MATSUDAIRA told me: "The Chief Cabinet Secretary was over to discuss whether to petition the Throne for an Imperial Rescript or for the Premier to receive the Imperial Rescript since it was the first anniversary of the July 7 Incident (China). When the Premier proceeded to the Imperial Palace, it was decided that he would receive the Imperial Rescript.

On the morning of the 5th, I (HARADA) called at the residence of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and chatted with him for about an hour. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal stated: "Yesterday, the Emperor summoned the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff and stated: 'I (Emperor) think this war (China Incident) should be ended as soon as possible. What do you think?' The War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff both replied: 'This China Incident will have to be carried out until the regime of CHIANG is brought to a downfall.' The Emperor was quite concerned about this matter because the Chief and the Deputy Chief of the General Staff had feverishly told the Emperor that this war must be stopped. Instead, preparations should be made against Soviet Russia. Since then, nothing has happened. Therefore, the Emperor thought that the Chief of the General Staff desires to deal with the incident as soon as possible. With that expectation, the Emperor asked the Chief of the General Staff (Prince KAN-IN) and the War Minister.

Navy Officers Complain

Since their replies were contrary to his expectations, their reports vague and not even convincing, the Emperor became very worried over the matter. In the evening, the Emperor summoned the Foreign Minister and inquired into various matters. The Foreign Minister explained the reasons for this and stated: 'Since the War Minister is a recent appointee, definite preparations have not yet been made. Therefore, I presume he replied in such a manner.' Then, the Foreign Minister left the Palace.

"If the Chief Aide-de-Camp were a thoughtful person who would convey the relevant wishes of the Emperor to the Army and also transmit details of the movements within the Army incessantly to the Emperor, everything would function smoothly. There is nothing to say against the character of the Chief Aide-de-Camp; however, it is regrettable that he never says what he should say and never transmits what should be transmitted to the Emperor, and vice versa. Therefore, great care must be taken hereafter in selecting the Chief Aide-de-Camp. As for the War Minister, he probably doesn't speak his mind to the Emperor because he isn't used to being received in audience by the Emperor."

Thereupon, I (HARADA) felt I wanted to discuss this matter with the Vice Minister of the Navy and I went to the Navy Minister's official residence and met the Vice-Minister of the Navy. Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO said: "A short while ago, HIRADA, the Aide-de-Camp came to the Navy Ministry. However, I did not meet him. Probably he came to discuss the matter. The War Minister is saying: 'We shall fight until CHIANG Kai-shek is overthrown' and 'We shall fight until the end.' But, in reality, it

is the Army which is most troubled by the China Incident. Consequently, it is also the Army which really wants to cease fighting in China. There is no doubt about this fact."

At noon, I (HARADA) had Gen. ABE come to my office to see me. I explained all the details about the above matter. I asked him to relate it to ITAGAKI, when he met him on a suitable occasion, in a relevant fashion. I told Gen. ABE: "On the matter of selecting the Chief Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor, great care must be taken." Gen. ABE seemed in complete accord with my opinion. He said concerning ITAGAKI: "ITAGAKI has, in recent times, gradually quieted down. This is a welcome fact."

On the morning of the 6th, I went to Okitsu and met Prince SAIONJI. I gave him reports on recent current affairs. Prince SAIONJI said: "I have recently observed the following in this vicinity and this is a widely prevalent custom. When the family of a dead soldier receives condolence-money from the Government, funeral services then memorial services, etc., are performed for many days in succession after the arrival of the remains of the dead soldier and much money is wasted in eating and drinking for celebrating the spirit of the dead. This is a bad custom which has prevailed for decades wherein the family of the war dead, in reality, is not able to save any substantial amount of the original fund granted by the Government. KIDO should take measures towards rectifying this bad custom. This is no joke. In some cases, after such a celebration for the dead, there hardly remains sufficient funds to erect a tombstone for the deceased soldier."

Navy Officers Complain

I (HARADA) returned to Oiso on the 7th. On the morning of the 8th, at 6:00 o'clock, Capt. TAKAGI, Provisional Research Section Chief, Navy Ministry Secretariat, said: "I want to see you immediately." Consequently, I went to see him and talked with him from 6:00 until 9:30 a.m. Capt. TAKAGI said: "Immediate measures should be taken to cope with the situation; otherwise a scandalous incident might break out. At present, nothing is likely to occur. Nevertheless, channels for free exchange of opinions between the higher and lower echelons must be provided. For instance, on problems under discussion at the Five Ministers' Conference, officials of the rank of section chief in the General Staff Headquarters seem to be well informed; moreover, even ronin (political racketeers) who have connections with the War Ministry know the contents thereof. But, on the other hand, officials of section chief rank in the Navy Ministry have no knowledge whatsoever.

"Sometime ago, Prince CHICHIBU and Prince TAKAMATSU visited Premier KONOYE at his home in Ogikubo. It was evident that Prince CHICHIBU was well informed of the topic under discussion at the Five Ministers' Conference. (The plan, pending discussion at the Five Ministers' Conference had been formulated in the section of the War Ministry under Prince CHICHIBU's command). However, Prince TAKAMATSU, whose work concerns strategical operations at the Naval General Staff Headquarters knew nothing about them. Therefore, in order to obtain information, Prince TAKAMATSU inquired about the matter the next day from an official at the Naval General Staff Headquarters who was supposed to be in charge of such

[redacted]

matters. However, the official who was supposed to be in charge of such matters also knew nothing. Moreover, officials of section chief rank of the Naval General Staff Headquarters learned, from the question of Prince TAKAMATSU that the discussion of the Five Ministers' Conference had progressed to some extent. As the result of this, rumors attacking YONAI, the Navy Minister, became rampant, charging: 'The Army is well informed about the matter, but the Navy has no information whatsoever thereof. This has occurred because of the Navy Minister's ineptitude.' I fear this sort of dissatisfaction will continue to become aggravated should the free exchange of information between the Minister, Vice-Minister, Bureau Chiefs and Section Chiefs not be improved. Of course, it is not likely that anything serious will break out under present circumstances." Capt. TAKAGI was extremely worried. He also said: "I should really be telling this to my commanding officer, the Naval Affairs Bureau Chief, and he should in turn convey it to the Vice-Minister who in turn should transmit it to the Navy Minister. However, the present Naval Affairs Bureau Chief is not the kind of person who likes to do that sort of thing. He dislikes to do such a thing because he is a rather mild person. However, should the present situation be permitted to prevail, it would eventually start a sequence of undesirable incidents. Therefore, will you please give this matter due consideration and try to do something about it?" He left a sort of a memorandum of his (TAKAGI's) opinions. From this memorandum, the following is evident: "The so-called 'faux pas' of the Navy Minister, which occurred at the Five Ministers' Conference, is a groundless rumor.

Navy Officers Complain

It is not true that at the Five Ministers' Conference, the Navy Minister said: 'Should CHIANG Kai-shek ask me to make peace with China, I would be willing to come to terms with him' and that the other ministers had ignored it with a laugh. "Moreover, by this memorandum it becomes clearly evident that the contents of the UGAKI-CRAIGIE conference, as shall be explained in a later paragraph, had been entirely perverted and disseminated among the young navy officers for the purpose of injuring Foreign Minister UGAKI and Navy Minister YONAI.

If I would mention this to Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO, there's no doubt that he would mention it to TAKAGI, for he and TAKAGI are very close friends. When it becomes evident that Capt. TAKAGI had mentioned such things, it might create quite an embarrassing situation for him. Therefore, I thought it would be better to talk this matter over with an older Navy-officer and have the matter handled suitably.

On the evening of the 11th, I (HARADA) had Baron TAKAGI invite Adm. OKADA, Adm. NOMURA and also MATSUDAIRA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, at his home for dinner. When I mentioned the gist of Capt. TAKAGI's words, both Admrals OKADA and NOMURA stated: "This is a very important matter and must be handled cautiously. We will do our best in disposing of the matter." We talked until late that night and parted.

That same morning, the 11th, OMURA, the Governor of Nagano Prefecture, visited me. OMURA repeatedly stated: "The bureaucratic circles are ill-disposed towards the present Cabinet."

On the 12th, KOSHINO, the Chief of General Affairs

RESTRICTED

Navy Officers Complain

Bureau of Manchukuo, called on me early in the morning. While talking with him on various matters, HOSHINO stated: "When I came out to Tokyo this time, I noticed that administrative cooperation among the various ministries are very bad. Something must be done about it. The best thing is to have a person like ISHIWATA, the Finance Vice-Minister, appointed as Chief Cabinet Secretary and have him convene vice-ministers' conferences. The present Chief Cabinet Secretary might be a man with political abilities, but in order to get a government policy realized, he himself must personally supervise its execution; the realization of a government policy through ordinary administrative channels can hardly be expected. The administrative cooperation between government agencies is, in general, exceedingly bad." Regarding War Minister ITAGAKI, he stated: "I have been together with ITAGAKI for a long time. He is not a person that would do anything eccentric, nor act like a robot. He is a man that is very cautious and would take full responsibilities in case of trouble. This, I'm positive about."

I (HARADA) then heard about the improvements in Manchukuo and of his (HOSHINO's) views on government affairs in Japan. Therefore, I thought it better, if he would talk to Premier KONOYE on the subject. I telephoned Premier KONOYE: "HOSHINO is here talking on various interesting subjects. I think it is advisable for you to hear his story for your own reference." However, KONOYE replied: "The Cabinet meeting is scheduled to be held today. Therefore, after the Cabinet meeting, I will have dinner together with HOSHINO." KONOYE asked me: "Please make this known to the Chief Cabinet

RESTRICTED

Secretary." Therefore, I immediately made arrangements with the Chief Cabinet Secretary. After the Cabinet meeting, HOSHINO went to dinner and met the Premier.

That evening, Premier KONOYE told me: "I am going to my son-in-law SHIMAZU's home for dinner. Won't you come over after dinner?" Therefore, after dinner, I went to SHIMAZU's home and talked with the Premier on various subjects. We talked about HOSHINO, the dissatisfaction on the part of the Navy, especially about dining only with War Minister ITAGAKI and not including the Navy Minister; for such actions leave an unfavorable impression on the lower ranks in the Navy.

I (HARADA) asked the Premier: "Did you hear HOSHINO's story?" The Premier answered: "Yes, I heard it. It furnished me with much information." I then told Premier KONOYE: "It is best that you have the Chief Cabinet Secretary devote himself to Government affairs and appoint someone else that is capable like the Chief Secretary to handle the clerical work." The Premier seemed to be in complete accord with my opinion.

Early in the morning of the 13th, I called on the Navy Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO. I mentioned Capt. TAKAGI's conversation of the other day: "In the conversation between the Foreign Minister and CRAIGIE, there were rumors to the effect that the Foreign Minister made a commitment that Japan will not attack Canton and Hainan. So to confirm it, I phoned Foreign Minister UGAKI yesterday and inquired into the matter. UGAKI stated: "Nonsense. I have not made any reply on military operations. When military operations are still continued, Japan has no intentions of controlling Canton and Hainan politically,

or to make it her territory. There is no room for any reply now on justified military operations. Since there is a war going on, I am unable to make comments on the intentions of the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals." I mentioned this to Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO, who ascertained it through the Foreign Ministry. Being aware of the actual situation, he made it known to his subordinates. I told Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO: "In various respects, such rumors produce bad results. Therefore every precaution should be taken." The Vice-Minister talked on various matters.

RESTRICTED

Saionji - Harada Memoirs

Chapter 282
(16 July 1938)

Changkufeng Border Clash

Translated by Miss Fumiko Segawa

Navy Vice Minister YAMAMOTO said: "In viewing the contents of the plan presented to the Five Ministers' Council by the section chiefs of the Army General Staff, it is unimportant whether the Five Ministers' Council takes action. First, the fundamental plan will be decided upon and outlined by the Five Ministers' Council and then be offered to bureau chiefs and then to section chiefs, with instructions such as: 'You should consider making preparations according to this plan.' From one point of view, the decision is made by section chiefs of the General Staff when the basic principles of our national policy call for decisions by the Ministers' Councils. However, this method is unwise because confidential matters become known to groups such as the rightists and other low fellows. Oddly enough, even the section chiefs of the Navy are not informed as to the actual facts. Speaking from a logical point of view, the Navy's plan seems most fitting; that is, the one of superiors giving orders and handing it down to the subordinates. Once the general policy has been decided, this should be made known, to a certain degree, to the section chiefs concerned. If the Army is to revise its plan, it will be similar to something the Navy has been doing for years."

"I believe it is only wise for the bureau and section chiefs of the Army and Navy (Ministries), and also of the Army and Navy General Staffs, to gather at the offices of the Asia Bureau Chief of the Foreign Ministry to discuss the basic policies decided upon at the Five Ministers' Councils and make their decisions then and there. Should it be otherwise, the situation would be that the lower echelons of the

RESTRICTED

Army would be well-informed, whereas those of the Navy would not. This will only cause unnecessary errors in their work, so it should be carefully considered." The Vice Minister of the Navy was quite concerned over devising a harmonious plan.

At ten o'clock, I visited Finance Minister IKEDA and presented the memo Capt. TAKAGI (Navy) had brought previously. I told IKEDA: "It is like this, so please consider it fully. In order to strengthen the Vice Ministers' Council, we should create something like an under-secretary. Premier KONOYE should resign as the Director of the Planning Board and AOKI should replace him. Then, AOKI can assume the leadership in the Vice Ministers' Council." Finance Minister IKEDA heartily agreed and said that he would keep it in mind.

I also told IKEDA: "I believe that it is a good thing for the Foreign Minister to decide on the Vice Minister soon. I spoke of SAITO to KONOYE and have also informed Foreign Minister UGAKI. UGAKI said: 'It is undesirable and dangerous to place such a sensitive genius like SAITO in a position where he would have control of all duties. How about retaining the present Vice Minister and replace the present bureau and departmental heads with better men?' This is also another plan." I told this to IKEDA and arranged it so that he would speak of this matter with UGAKI.

Since I had an appointment to meet Premier KONOYE at 2:00 o'clock, I called at his official residence. We spoke for about an hour. I told KONOYE: "We must improve the Vice Ministers' Councils."

The Navy Vice Minister, in particular, had previously told me: "The Chief Cabinet Secretary is a man who is quite capable of parliamentary duties but woefully incapable of business affairs. As I have stated before, he has been in

office for over a year now but he never remains at his duties. He would, more often than not, say: 'There is nothing to do today' and would leave for such things as conferences with other councillors. The Vice Ministers' Council exists in name only and is, in actuality, ineffective. YOKOMIZO, the Chief of the Information Department, comes out with silly remarks like: 'Such and such should be done in order to conserve rice, etc.' If such is the situation, there is no method of maintaining liaison among the various ministries."

I also told KONOYE: "The Vice Ministers' Councils must be strengthened and the liaison among the various ministries improved. As long as you, yourself, report your resolutions to the Emperor the day before saying: 'Hereafter, matters of national policy which have been decided upon should be put into effect immediately,' you must take some sort of action at once. Would it not be feasible to have either AOKI Kazuo or ISHIWATA appointed to the post of Director of the Planning Board and make it a nomination by His Majesty?" To this, the Premier stated: "YOSHINO and KAYA should be nominated by His Majesty before them." I replied: "Imperial nomination of YOSHINO and KAYA could talk place whenever there is a vacancy. Moreover, if this does not occur during the administration of this Cabinet, you could leave the request to the next Cabinet before you resign and it will undoubtedly be carried out. Therefore, won't it be desirable if TAKI is selected before the others?"

I (HARADA) also spoke of the Foreign Vice Minister. It was not my intention to show the Navy's memo, but Finance Minister IKEDA had remarked: "Nevertheless, it would be wiser to have KONOYE read the notes personally." Therefore, I handed the note to the Premier saying: "Please read it over

carefully." To this KONOYE retorted: "It is distressing that the Army and Navy are not getting along well with each other." I (HARADA) further commented: "Vice Minister YAMAMOTO feels that it is only natural that you (KONOYE) should dine with the Army Minister. Vice Minister YAMAMOTO has stated: 'Due to the state of things at present, the Army is the most important factor. Therefore, without the co-operation of the Army, it is impossible to administer the affairs of State and I am well aware of the Premier's efforts. Since the Navy is well under control, I am sure he (Premier) is not too concerned.' Those below him (YAMAMOTO) such as the section chiefs and the younger set, are complaining: 'Is dining with only the War Minister without the presence of the Navy Minister due to the Navy Minister's inefficiency, or is it because the Premier thinks little of the Navy (believing the Premier contemptuous of the Navy)?'" I (HARADA) suggested to the Premier: "How would it be if you included the Navy Minister at a luncheon?" To this he replied: "Three will make conversation difficult."

The Vice Minister had previously told me (HARADA) : "Minister ITAGAKI is making advances toward the Navy in an attempt to improve the relationship between the two ministries. This is because he is well aware of the unsatisfactory situation between the two. He (ITAGAKI) is looking for an opportunity to dine together and I (Vice Minister) am very worried." I (HARADA) told this to Premier KONOYE and tried to prevail upon him to do likewise, but he remarked: "Let me consider it further."

On the way home, I called on the Chief Cabinet Secretary at his office and related everything that I had mentioned to KONOYE. I said: "Prince KONOYE remarked: "He (KAZAMI) must

[redacted]

Restricted Classification Removed Per Executive Order 10501

be retained as Chief Secretary and assist me politically. Otherwise, I will be greatly inconvenienced.' Nevertheless, as you (KAZAMI) are not very fond of, nor proficient in administrative work, everyone is quite concerned. It was mentioned at today's Vice Ministers' Conference that you would not do. I believe that an official such as the Director of the Planning Board or someone else capable of administrative work should assume control of the Vice Ministers' Conference in your place and report the details to you. In this way, the council would become an effective one. This will also be a way of improving liaison between ministries. When a policy is settled and about to be put into administrative operation, the action of the chief secretary must be very prompt. Therefore, I am wondering why you do not resolutely set about toward the realization of this policy." The Chief Cabinet Secretary seemed to be in complete accord and said: "We were thinking of doing that very thing." Therefore, I commented: "Then, do it as soon as possible." With this, I took my leave.

That evening, I started off with my family to dine with a friend in Yokohama. While enroute on the train, I unexpectedly met Capt. TAKAGI (Navy) who stated: "Perhaps you are aware of this, but upon negotiating with KAO Tsung-wu and KAGESA of the Army, I learned that KAO Tsung-wu remarked: 'If the Japanese Government will guarantee to support WANG Ching-wei, CHIANG Kai Shek will probably resign. Therefore, I greatly desire that a letter to that effect be sent to CHIANG Kai Shek from the Premier. In other words, I would like to have a secret despatch.' The Premier flatly refused this, so I presume ITAGAKI will write the letter instead."

Capt. TAKAGI further stated: "CRAIGIE pleaded to the Foreign Minister: 'We want freedom of navigation on the

Yangtze River. When the British who had lived in Nanking fled the city and when they later tried to return, the Army allowed the Americans to enter, but refused the British. With conditions such as they are, I will be unable to remain in Japan as Ambassador.' Therefore, when the Foreign Minister said: 'I will order the official there to permit the six Britishers to return to Nanking immediately and I will also take full responsibility in settling the matter pertaining to the Yangtze River navigation after the present operation ceases. Have confidence in me,' CRAIGIE departed with great relief."

On the morning of the 14th, I visited Welfare Minister KIDO at his private residence and heard about the Internal Political Council and other matters. KIDO spoke insultingly of the Internal Political Council and he even said: "ARAKI and SUETSUGU had a hot argument. ARAKI, being an eloquent speaker, rattled on and on and since he talked nonsense, it made SUETSUGU angry." I then mentioned the talk I had with Premier KONOYE concerning the leadership and strengthening of the Vice Ministers' Council and KIDO also stated: "I am very much in favor of it too."

I telephoned KONOYE: "I am finally leaving this afternoon for Shizuoka. Tomorrow, I will accompany Prince SAIONJI from Okitsu to Gotemba. Has anything in particular come up?" KONOYE replied: "War Minister ITAGAKI visited the Emperor yesterday and made an informal report concerning the change in personnel. That means KOISO will be placed on the reserve list. This seems to be the only important matter and the others will be announced soon. Please extend my very best regards to Prince SAIONJI."

On the 14th at 3:00 pm, I went to Shizuoka on the "Fuji" On the train, I accidentally met KOMAI who formerly was in

Manchukuo. During the conversation, KOMAI stated: "KUHARA, MAZAKI; SHIHARA Koichiro, and OKAWA Shumei have been holding occasional meetings recently and that is wrong." I (HARADA) should be careful on this too.

On the 15th at 9:30 am, I went to Prince SAIONJI's place and spoke to him in general about the various matters that happened quite recently. The Prince said: "Control is effective too, but we must consider the political angle just as much as planning the economic angle. The level of the Japanese people is still low so there is little concern: However, if you should look at Europe's history of about 1840, you will notice that economic control went beyond its scope and became a serious problem. There are many instances in history when the situation could not be saved from a political angle. Consideration must be given to that point. No doubt, conditions differ between Europe and Japan, but it still requires some attention." SAIONJI sympathizing with KONOYE, said: "The present Government's doings are very inconsistent and it looks impossible to handle the situation. This is a most difficult period and I feel sorry for KONOYE." We then took the 10:29 train for Numazu and there we transferred and reached Gotemba at 12:27. Seeing SAIONJI safely at his villa in Gotemba, I immediately returned to Tokyo. That evening, I called Navy Commander-in-Chief HASEGAWA; HARA, the Chief of the Air Arsenal; MATSUDAIRA; and their families for dinner at the Koyokan, and they all seemed to have enjoyed it.

On the 18th, I met the Foreign Vice-Minister and inquired into the Russo-Manchukuo (Changkufeng) border dispute which occurred on the night of the 17th. The Foreign Vice Minister said: "It is a local incident so I believe it won't become a serious matter." He also mentioned various matters within

RESTRICTED

the Ministry and said: "Since the change of the Foreign Minister, conditions have improved somewhat."

I then went to see the Vice-Minister of the Navy and spoke to him on recent matters. However, I did not make any comments on problems pertaining directly to the Ministry. Concerning the Soviet problem, he seemed quite worried about it but he thinks: "It's not too serious a matter. Moscow is not yet fully aware of the incident."

Then, MATSUDAIRA came and said: "This matter caused His Majesty a great deal of worry. His Majesty's visit to Hayama is still indefinite."

That evening, I invited the families of KIDO, HOSOKAWA, and SHIMAZU over. Prince KONOYE was unable to attend so sent his wife instead. KIDO appeared quite concerned about the matter. Besides the Internal Political Council, KIDO thought it unnecessary for the Premier to have breakfast with ARAKI and SUETSUGU and was worried about KONOYE's health.

On the morning of the 19th, I met Foreign Minister UGAKI and he said: "I feel somewhat uneasy on the matter concerning Russia because both parties seem to be confused. However, I believe this matter will be settled without much trouble."

I met the Premier at his official residence at about 4:30 p.m., after the Five Ministers' Council. Not having enough time, we did not talk long. KONOYE said: "We definitely have no intention to challenge Russia from our side. This is entirely a different case from that of the Lukuochiao (Marco Polo Bridge) Incident. The point I am really worried over, is what the central (Russian) authorities are thinking."

I thought of dropping in at the Foreign Office to see the Foreign Minister but since I did not have time, I didn't see him. I chatted with the Director of the Treaty Bureau at

his office. The Director said: "I presume it is not too serious a problem."

Early on the morning of the 20th, I went to Foreign Minister UGAKI's private residence in Yotsuya. I heard about the Five Ministers' Council and various other matters. UGAKI said: "The Five Ministers' Council is progressing very satisfactorily and I presume it will end with one or two more meetings. All provisional matters are being decided and even the British Ambassador happily said: 'Now, I am able to uphold my honor as Ambassador.' The British Ambassador is a fine man. The American Ambassador is exceptionally nice. When they said: 'We have great hopes for the new minister,' I told them that everything does not progress satisfactorily but let's take everything in stride."

Premier KONOYE said to me: "I would like to give an interim report on the progress of the Five Ministers' Council but I guess it is much easier for you to present a complete report, so please wait awhile." Therefore, I did not make any effort to copy KONOYE's report and decided to wait as he had asked.

Then, at 8:30, I called on the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at his private residence and spoke to him on various matters. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal said: "It appears that the Government is deciding on various matters and is making plans regarding the Russian problem. They have not yet decided what to do if the Russians do accept our challenge, and I am worried on that point. Such men as TOKUTOMI, HONDA and NAKANO are fervently stirring up anti-British feelings and we must do something to curb this. Regarding the Manchukuo-Soviet border problem, it appears that the Chief of the General Staff strongly told the

Emperor: 'The position in question is like a key position in a battle. We must take it, even by force. However, it will not be carried out without Imperial sanction.' Therefore, I told the Emperor that positions of strategic importance, we cannot take another country's possession by force. We must settle the problem of which is just. I also told the Emperor that the General Staff Headquarters said that even according to the Soviet map, the position in question belongs to Manchukuo. But, looking over the general situation, I believe this is not the time to wage war against Russia. The Emperor felt the same way and immediately asked me: 'What if they carried it out at their own discretion without my sanction?" Therefore, I told him that if the Army is unable to suppress it and results in a war, the fate of Japan is in question. Maybe it is just a groundless fear, but I still feel restless. The Emperor said: 'I guess it must reach that stage before the Army comes to its senses.' The Government seems to be taking a calm attitude. The Kwantung Army and the Korean Army doesn't seem to want to fight. I presume it is best to leave this as a pending question and let it gradually take its course through diplomatic negotiations."

Saionji - Harada Memoirs

Chapter 283
(28 July 1938)

Emperor Chides Army

Translated by Lt. Hakuzo Nitta

On the 21st, I went to Gotemba and as usual, I reported full particulars to the Prince. Concerning what the Emperor had said: "If the Army doesn't go to that extent, their eyes will not be opened," the Prince said: "I believe the Emperor's observation is wrong. Their eyes won't be opened no matter how far it goes with things as they are today. I think it is necessary that the Emperor should not sanction this. If it ever means war with Russia by using force as an instrument of negotiation, it would be better for KONOYE to resign viewing it from both the public and private standpoints. It would benefit KONOYE's future and also the nation." Thus, he was claiming that it was proper for KONOYE to resign in such a case. I returned that very day to Tokyo after I had reported to the Prince.

When I met HATSUDAIRA, he said: "Accompanied by Chief of Staff Prince KAN-IN and the Minister of War, I proceeded to the Palace since they desired to make an appeal. The Emperor, thinking that the War Minister had come again to request his sanction concerning the use of force in the negotiation of the problem of the Soviet-Manchukuo border and also thinking that it would cast a reflection on their prestige if they meet him and do not succeed in obtaining his sanction, transmitted the following through the Chief Aide-de-Camp with his deep and sympathetic feeling: 'If you are coming by any chance to obtain my sanction for use of force, I have no such

RESTRICTED

idea in mind. If you are coming for that, you don't have to come.' In spite of this message, the Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister said: 'We would still like to request an audience.' So, at 11:00 a.m. the Emperor consented: 'If that is so, have them come.' The Emperor awaited their appearance, but they made the Emperor wait more than an hour after they had arrived at the Palace. The Chief Aide-de-Camp maintained contact between them and finally, close to noon, they were received in audience. Just as the Emperor had thought, the War Minister appealed for the request to use force. The Emperor said: 'Have Ministers who are concerned been contacted?' The War Minister replied: 'Both the Foreign and Navy Ministers have agreed.' Previously, both the Foreign Minister and the Navy Minister had expressed their opinions in favor of troop distribution, but they were absolutely against the use of force. The Emperor had already known this and when the War Minister had answered: 'Both Ministers have consented,' the Emperor felt as if he was deceived and with an excited countenance he said: 'The actions of the Army in the past have been abominable. Speaking of the Liutiaokou case in the Manchukuo Incident and the doings at the Marco Polo Bridge at the beginning of this incident, there was absolutely no obedience to central orders. There are infrequent instances when the methods used have been arbitrary and sneaky which is altogether improper as my army. I feel that it is abominable in various ways. Nothing like that must happen this time....' And to the War Minister, he admonished: 'Hereafter, you may not move one soldier without my command.' He came out in such a strong tone that the

War Minister retreated very himiliated. When the War Minister came back, he said: 'I can never look into the Emperor's face again. I would definitely like to resign.' The Chief of the General Staff said: 'With things as they are, I cannot assume the responsibility of assistance to the Emperor as the senior in the Army. I would like to resign.' The Chief Aide-de-Camp, in great concern, thought he might get the Emperor to speak in a mellower tone. Since the inclination to intercede did exist, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal thought that it would not do to have him fail in something in which he was unaccustomed, even if there was sincerity behind it. He said: 'Either I or the Premier will handle that.' Reassured that it would be better, I left everything up to the Premier."

"The Premier appeared before the Emperor and asked about the whole situation. The Emperor seemed to be thinking of it as comparatively simple and said: 'Please urge both the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff to stay in office.' The Premier called the War Minister and told him: 'It would be disturbing to have you resign now. In the first place, if you say that the Emperor has no confidence in you, there is no reason whatsoever for him to have approved you as War Minister recently. There is absolutely no reason to say he lacks confidence in you when you just recently became the War Minister by the Emperor's command. Also, he does not lack confidence in the Army. It was just that he becomes suspicious every time such an incident occurs. He spoke critically about that point and he probably meant for you to be careful hereafter.' At any rate, the War Minister left his future course up to the Premier. The Premier

put an end to the Chief Aide-de-Camp's maneuverings and everything was concluded without mishap, but from the lower bracket could be heard: 'UGAKI lied,' and 'How insulting.' At the General Staff Headquarters, especially, it was said that they were quite indignant and the circumstance had been aggravated."

When I met KIDO later that day, he said: "Why didn't the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal act in concert with the Premier and do something? It is disturbing to have the Emperor takin such pointed actions." However, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal had not taken up or mentioned the Liutiaokou or the Marco Polo Bridge Incidents to the Emperor. It was something which the Emperor had said on the spur of the moment without any preparations, and thus, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal had nothing whatsoever to do with it at that time. I do not think it unreasonable that there was misunderstanding between the War Minister and Foreign Minister UGAKI; that is, for the War Minister thinking that the Foreign Minister had not clearly and absolutely stated his opposition. However, when the Foreign Minister had met the War Minister, he had probably said: "I am in agreement with threatening Russia to the extent of distributing troops, but you must not use military force," or he may have said: "If it's just up to that point, you can do it." It may be supposed that the War Minister was given this impression because the Foreign Minister had been a former army man and may have been thinking about as such.

On the 22nd, I met Navy Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO at the Navy Minister's official residence and heard that when the War, Navy, and Foreign Ministers had met and

the War Minister had attempted to secure their consents on the use of force, both the Navy and Foreign Ministers had said: "We are opposed to that. We cannot agree to that." The War Minister had immediately left his seat and clasping his head he mumbled: "How troublesome," and went out. Therefore, the Navy knows that it is a clear fact that the Navy Minister had expressed his opposition. I surmised that later when the War and Foreign Ministers had met, that what I had mentioned before could have taken place.

When I met KIDO, he said: "I intend to speak with KONOYE leisurely tomorrow at Karuizawa. If the Army says that we will have to fight with Russia, then I will recommend KONOYE to resign resolutely. The Premier was also of that determination."

When I met Finance Minister IKEDA, he greatly admired the Emperor's actions and was very grateful for it.

On the 25th, I went to Gotemba and reported the circumstances since the last visit. I said: "The General Staff Headquarters group is clamorous, saying this and that, on the Emperor's not having confidence in the Army as such." The Prince replied with a laugh: "Just whose General Staff Headquarters and Army is it? Whether he has or hasn't any confidence in them; aren't they the Emperor's? It would be very grand if it can be safely concluded without mentioning the use of force."

I departed, and on the 26th, when I met KIDO who had just returned from Karuizawa, he said: "The newspapers had written up whether or not a minister without portfolio would be assigned to the job just as if KONOYE

had uttered it, but we did not speak of it at all. We discussed whether we would cope with it as a war situation, that is, what we would do in case the Army does not comply." I received a letter from Capt. TAKAGI of the Navy and it said: "The strength of the Soviet forces at the spot where the Soviet-Manchukuo border incident occurred was approximately 200. The Korean Army despatched a battalion to cope with them. There are no indications that the Soviet Union is preparing for war. The two conclusions on the situation as made by the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army are: A) The Soviet forces must be compelled to withdraw from Chankufeng. For this, the use of force will be necessary. B) Even if we resort to the use of force, Russia will not enlarge the incident. The reasons for this are: a) We do not see any aggravation of the situation, such as their furthering of military preparations or increase in mobilization. b) At present there is dissension between the Red Army and the OGPU. From these observations, the Kwantung Army Headquarters persistently urged the use of force to the General Staff Headquarters. Because of this, the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff sought an Imperial audience on the 21st." The criticism of the Navy was: "They (Army) are saying this without taking into consideration the Soviet air force or their submarines. However, this is not very good."

That evening, Gen. KAWASHIMA and FUNADA of MITSUBISHI came and dined with me at Oiso. Gen. KAWASHIMA said: "The Kwantung Army is still no good. The men on the top hesitated too much with Maj. Gen. ISHIHARA Kanji. It was not good to have men like SUGIYAMA and ARAKI and other top

men fiddling with these inflammations (incidents)."

On the 26th, the Chief of the Metropolitan Police came and said: "It looks very bad for Foreign Minister UGAKI."

On the 27th, I called at the Premier's home in Ogikubo and spoke with him lengthily on various things. He said: "Nothing out of the ordinary has happened." Then, he asked me to take some of the written items which had been decided on at the Five Ministers' Conference and said: "Please show these to Prince SAIONJI." I returned with them in my hand.

Saionji - Harada Memoirs

Chapter 284
(5 August 1938)

Cool Advice on Changkufeng

Translated by Miss Fumiko Segawa

On the 28th, I received a telephone call from the Imperial Household Minister. He said: "The Emperor will go to Hayama on the 30th. His Majesty is planning to stay for approximately ten days. On this occasion, we are planning to set an example of informal travelling for His Majesty." He apologized, saying: "I have been trying to contact you by phone for some time in the past; however, I haven't been able to talk to you until today because you happened to be away on previous occasions. I am sorry I am notifying you of this matter at this late date. Please notify Prince SAIONJI about this."

I had Premier KONOYE let me copy the items decided upon at the Five Ministers' Conference. At the request of the Premier, I am going to take it to Prince SAIONJI.

I was extremely concerned over the outcome of the Changkufeng Incident. In the meantime, I went to Hakone on the 31st and talked with Finance Minister IKEDA. When I returned to my lodgings, there was a telephone call from Tokyo which informed me that Premier KONOYE will return in a hurry this evening to his official residence in Tokyo from Karuizawa. According to this phone call, there is a rumor that the problem of Changkufeng had developed into the use of military force, and realizing the importance of the situation, KONOYE was returning to Tokyo."

I immediately called Chief Cabinet Secretary KAZAMI by phone. He said: "The situation is not serious. However, it seems that Soviet forces have commenced to attack

RESTRICTED

the Japanese forces. I requested the Premier to return to Tokyo, lest the situation should become aggravated." Before calling the Chief Cabinet Secretary, I had telephoned both KIDO and MATSUDAIRA; however, they were unable to give me any information. In the course of his talk over the phone, KAZAMI, the Chief Cabinet Secretary said: "In order to avoid having this incident appear to be too serious, and to prevent the aggravation of rumors, a Cabinet meeting will not be convened this evening. I am planning to have the three Ministers; Navy, Army, and Foreign, convene together in order to discuss methods for coping with the situation."

Thereupon, I immediately called Finance Minister IKEDA at his hotel and explained the situation to him. Finance Minister IKEDA said: "I haven't heard anything from Tokyo; however, I am worried, so I am going to return to Tokyo."

On the 3rd, MATSUDAIRA, the Imperial Household Minister, was planning to come to my lodgings at Miyanoshita in Hakone; however, I telephoned MATSUDAIRA and said: "I am returning to Oiso, so please come to Oiso." I decided to return to Oiso early in the morning of the 3rd because the road on the way down the mountain was obstructed by a landslide. Therefore, I got on the electric train and went to Odawara. From there, I returned safely home.

Around 1:00 p.m. of that day, MATSUDAIRA came to my home on his way back to Tokyo from Hayama. He said: "When this incident occurred, the Foreign Office sent instructions to SHIGEMITSU, stating: "See LITVINOV immediately," so SHIGEMITSU met him. On that occasion, he

was severely taken to task by LITVINOV; therefore, on the present occasion, he was especially cautious and did not personally go to see LITVINOV. He sent his Charge d' Affaires in his place. Here is how the situation developed: First, approximately ten Soviet soldiers were on the other side of Changkufeng. Because they had crossed the border into Manchukuo, the Japanese fired on them. In reality, we don't know how much of this report was true. Before this incident took place, the Army had begun to station men in this area; but because the Emperor ordered War Minister ITAGAKI: 'You must not send armed forces into that area,' the Army had to stop their plan abruptly. Because the Army had to withdraw their troops which had been stationed according to their original plan, it appeared to the Soviet Forces as if the Japanese troops had retreated and the Soviet forces counter-attacked the Japanese. But, they lost a great number of tanks and heavy arms to the Japanese. In the interim, while this was taking place, the Foreign Office dispatched an order to SHIGEMITSU, the Ambassador to Moscow: 'Should this incident become aggravated, the consequent result will be serious.' But, LITVINOV, the Soviet Foreign Minister would not see SHIGEMITSU; he made his reply to Ambassador SHIGEMITSU in written form, transmitted to SHIGEMITSU through a Section Chief of the Soviet Foreign Office. In the meantime, Soviet war planes again transgressed the border and dropped bombs; so, Ambassador SHIGEMITSU again requested an interview with LITVINOV, the Soviet Foreign Minister. However, he would not meet SHIGEMITSU. And again, SHIGEMITSU had to convey his thoughts to the Soviet Foreign Minister in written form through a section

chief. SHIGEMITSU sent the following report to the Japanese Foreign Office: 'The attitude of the Soviet Union towards this incident is extremely conservative. The Soviet Foreign Office's attitude towards Japanese diplomatic officials in the Soviet Union seems to indicate that they are regarding this as an inconsequential incident. The public opinion of the Soviet people, in regard to this incident, is extremely cool and indifferent. I request the Japanese Government to handle this matter with a similarly cool attitude.' The Soviet's acting Ambassador to Japan requested an interview with Foreign Minister UGAKI yesterday, July 2nd, around 4:00 p.m.; however, UGAKI did not meet him. Instead, a secretary met him and accepted the Soviet protest. Its contents were extremely commonplace and mild; its tone was not harsh. The wishes of the Army were; 'We would like to have the matter concerning the vicinity of Changkufeng settled as soon as possible. Should it become necessary, the War Ministry and the General Staff Headquarters are willing to withdraw the Japanese troops from Changkufeng. Please settle this matter through diplomatic negotiations as soon as possible.'

"Premier KONOYE went to Hayama on the 2nd, after the Cabinet meeting, and explained the matters discussed to the Emperor, in detail: 'The Government is desirous of placing the matter in the hands of the diplomatic officials and cease military actions as soon as possible.' KONOYE returned after explaining the details of the Soviet-Japanese clash at the site of the incident. At the Cabinet meeting, SUETSUGU, the Home Minister, urged strongly: 'The Army must desist from sending war planes

over the area.' Railways Minister NAKAJIMA strongly insisted: 'Should the Army take a firm attitude at the site of the incident, the matter can be solved at the spot.' However the other Cabinet ministers just ignored him. The Navy was absolutely against the matter and they said: 'The Navy has no surplus forces; under present circumstances, we can never consider waging a war.'"

The Government is of the opinion that we must, by all means, avoid waging war with the Soviet Union. The Army is also in complete accord with this policy of the Government and is urging the Government to settle the matter through diplomatic negotiations. They are of the general opinion that a Border Arbitration Commission should be established in order to settle the border problem in the vicinity of Changkufeng, if not, of the whole Manchukuo border.

On the 2nd, in the afternoon, a Five Ministers' Conference was convened. They decided upon the following policy, which was immediately conveyed to the Foreign Minister. Sometime before this, the Foreign Minister had complained to the Premier: "I am worried because I have recently received no reports from Ambassador SHIGEMITSU at Moscow." This is what had been decided at the Five Ministers' Conference; "In order to forestall a change in the situation, the Japanese Government shall immediately start negotiations with the Soviet Union along the lines of the policy as previously decided upon. Military operations - including Air Force operations - at the site of the incident shall be immediately stopped. In order to realize this purpose, we shall immediately request the Foreign Minister to begin negotiations with

RESTRICTED

the Soviet Union for attaining the above end; Soviet troops shall be withdrawn to the highlands to the East of Changchih and the Japanese troops shall be withdrawn to the southwest of the unnamed pond west of Changkufeng." This was dispatched to the Japanese Embassy in Moscow and to the Army at the site of the incident. Simultaneously, the Soviet's Acting Ambassador at Tokyo who was summoned on the 3rd to the Foreign Ministry by HORINOUCHI, Vice-Minister of the Foreign Office was notified.

Several days ago, the German Ambassador at Tokyo, OTT, visited Foreign Minister UGAKI and said: "Germany, under present conditions, can hardly be expected to enter into a Japan-Germany Military Pact; please understand this matter." A Japan-Germany Military Pact is a thing which cannot be expected to be realized. But, some of the Rightists (Ultra-Nationalists) and young officers of the Army are maintaining a quixotically extreme attitude on the Changkufeng Incident under the expectation that a Japan-Germany Military Pact will be formed in the immediate future. Their attitude is hardly worthy of any consideration.

I returned to Tokyo on the evening of the 4th. I went to the Foreign Office to see the Vice-Minister. HORINOUCHI, the Vice-Minister said: "When the Changkufeng Incident broke out, the Emperor, would not permit the Army to take any actions whatsoever. The Emperor said: 'Not a single soldier shall be moved (to the site of the incident) without my permission,' regarding the activities of the Army; however, the Army had a regiment stationed on the hill north of Changkufeng. The troops were prepared to attack the Soviet troops on the south-

RESTRICTED

eastern hill in front of them. The Army is trying to justify the actions they took by saying: 'The Emperor had forbidden the movement of troops in regards to Changkufeng; this present incident is a separate matter.' The Army is equivocating; I think their attitude is absolutely outrageous. Fearing that the aforementioned regiment might take action, the War Minister dispatched an order to military authorities at the site, admonishing them not to take any irresponsible actions. Any such order should have been issued by the General Staff Headquarters - the Supreme Military Command - but this order was issued by the War Minister. The reason why the War Minister stuck his beak into matters pertaining purely to the Supreme Military Command was as follows: TANAKA Ryukichi and CHO Isamu, the young staff officers, famous for their complicity in the Sxiyuan Incident, would never obey anything any ordinary commander-in-chief would order. However, it is a known fact that, TANAKA Ryukichi is completely under the thumb of ITAGAKI, the War Minister. Because ITAGAKI is conscious of this fact, he issued the order for checking the activities of the Army in his name as War Minister."

Because SHIGEMITSU had once been refused an interview with LITVINOV, the Soviet Foreign Minister, he would not make any attempts to interview LITVINOV again regardless of instructions telegraphed to him many times ordering him to see LITVINOV. Finally, at 1:00 p.m., on the 4th (Moscow time), - 7:00 p.m. of the 4th, according to Tokyo time - he was scheduled to meet LITVINOV at Moscow. At 2:00 p.m. on the 4th, Vice-Minister HORINOUCHI of the Foreign Office summoned the Acting Ambassador of the

Soviet Union and had a conference with him; simultaneously, HO NOUCHI proposed a truce at the site of the incident. The Emperor was very worried over this matter; Premier KONOYE explained this in detail to UGAKI, the Foreign Minister. UGAKI, the Foreign Minister, was greatly awed by this and he pressed his subordinates to settle the negotiation with the Soviet Union satisfactorily.

On the morning of the 4th, I again went to Gotenba to make an interim report to Prince SAIONJI. I reported to him on the above mentioned matters. Returning to Tokyo, I went to the Foreign Office.

Saionji - Harada Memoirs

Chapter 285
(10 August 1938)

Navy Men Expound Views

Translated by Miss Miwako Yanamoto

I asked the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs about new developments. He stated: "They seem to be holding counter-attacks at the front lines, that is, at Changkufeng and around Shachaofeng. Shachaofeng is in a precarious position, and the Army has placed one infantry regiment there. TANAKA Ryukichi and CHO Isamu are maneuvering this and that, but it doesn't look as if it's going to end very soon. They are saying: 'The Emperor said: 'Do not move even one soldier without my orders.' However, this referred only to Changkufeng, and Shachaofeng is another story. Therefore, we are not going against an Imperial decree.' A telegram is supposed to be coming from SHIGEMITSU, but it doesn't come. If it comes, we should know the situation a little more clearly, but SHIGEMITSU seems to be taking his usual attitude."

There was a Cabinet meeting on the 5th. I met Navy Minister YONAI and the Vice-Minister of the Navy after that. They said: "It was decided at today's Cabinet meeting that we would speak firmly to Russia. The War, Navy and Foreign Ministers met and had a leisurely discussion."

I also met Premier KONOYE. He stated: "Prince SAIONJI must be very worried. I wondered if he isn't especially disappointed." I told him: "Naturally, Prince SAIONJI sympathized with you. Well, carry on with a firm hand." KONOYE replied: "Something must be done...." I said: "Perhaps matters do not proceed smoothly because the Foreign Minister is a layman." KONOYE said indignantly:

RESTRICTED

"No matter how much UGAKI exerts himself, if the Army in Korea and Manchukuo won't comply with orders, control is difficult even if the foreign policy is good."

In the evening, when I returned home, I asked Ambassador SATO to come over. As we dined, I asked Ambassador SATO for his opinion regarding the Foreign Minister and the Foreign Ministry. Ambassador SATO stated: "I am not charged with the actual situation at present and am not very cognizant of the matter. However, I would like to assist UGAKI indirectly somehow and help him avoid blunders." I said: "Won't you meet IKEDA on Sunday at Oiso? Finance Minister IKEDA and Foreign Minister UGAKI are very good friends, and they are both laymen in the field of diplomacy. I don't want them to bungle. If this will be your first meeting with IKEDA, I shall introduce you. Please see him and listen to him." Ambassador SATO said: "I am visiting Foreign Minister UGAKI at his private residence tomorrow morning, the 6th. I won't say anything about other matters. However, I do intend to say: 'It is absolutely out of the question to appoint Lt. Gen. OSHIMA as Ambassador to Germany.'"

There were two letters dated the 3rd and the 5th from Capt. TAKAGI of the Navy which had arrived during my absence. The one dated the 3rd was as follows:

We deeply regret the maladroit arbitrary decision of the local troops which have magnified complications. The Navy Ministry and the Navy General Staff Headquarters are coordinating their steps and are concentrating their full powers toward the prevention of another occurrence of such an unfortunate situation. We do not think that our goal will not be reached.

However, at present, there doesn't seem to be any indication of quieting down and we are chagrined.

As a result of your efforts, the Navy Minister has been helping the Premier a great deal since the occurrence of the dispute, using the original plan drafted by his personal staff. Privately, I am very happy about it. I only regret the fact that after the use of military force, General Staff Headquarters and Navy General Staff Headquarters look so lightly and optimistically upon the extent of resistance by Soviet Russia. We have spoken with the Operations Section and have agreed to execute speedily the plan to separate the forces. We plan to encourage General Staff Headquarters.

As you know, TANAKA Ryukichi and CHO Isamu who are on the blacklist, are in the Army in Korea. The Navy has made suggestions regarding them (to remove them), but we would like to ask for your deliberation upon secret means to dispose of them. Pushing aside innumerable difficulties and desiring to remove the peril to the nation, we would deeply appreciate your consent although you are very busy.

P.S. We are absolutely opposed to the use of planes and we ask for your aid on this matter.

The following is the letter dated the 5th:

Soviet troops which attacked us from midnight on the 3rd consisted of about four or five battalios and were the main force of the 40th Sniper Division (130 tanks, 80 guns). Our forces consisted of the 75th Regiment, 73rd Regiment, 76th Regiment, and three other battalions. The fighting was suspended around noon.

RESTRICTED

Navy Men Expound Views

For the most part we expected a stalemate on the 4th, but there were repeated attacks from the Changkufeng region from midnight. The enemy artillery positions on Hyo-zan were quiet in the morning. However, they resumed firing from around 4:00 p.m. Indications are that enemy firing has commenced from morning today, the 5th.

The general feeling is that the 2nd was the climax, and calm has been restored. However, as stated before, the fighting tends to become more violent, and we cannot relax our vigil. In addition to this, the Army and a group in the Navy blindly believe that Soviet Russia would not rise to battle and forget that they have seen our weaknesses. There is a danger that those with a shallow view, who try to come out strongly in jest, will carry out counter-measures while we are catching our breath. I believe that this was the reason for the failure of the disposition of the Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge) Incident of last July. I firmly believe that increased precaution and decisive enforcement of the separation of forces are necessary.

We further regret that the Europe and Asia Bureaus of the Foreign Ministry are made up of cowards, and yet they have been influenced by arguments of the die-hards. They maintain: "Since Soviet Russia will not rise to battle, it is necessary, from the standpoint of foreign policy, for us to deliver a blow on this occasion." They hesitate at constructive diplomatic measures. If it is a Foreign Ministry which cannot negotiate foreign policies without exercising military power, I keenly feel that we should attempt to destroy

RESTRICTED

the Foreign Ministry if this matter is settled as an incident. They desire war and seek some dispute. They enter into it without prospects of sure success and without hesitation but once they fall into difficulties they are dumbfounded and know not what to do. I believe that their irrational arguments will bring ruin to our country. Although we lack military strength and preparation of materials, I believe that only the Navy can wage a war against Russia. However, considering our national power, and from the standpoint of the general situation, the Navy maintains the cautious opinion that we should positively avoid a controversy with a third nation. In view of this, it is truly regrettable that the Foreign Ministry, without preparation or study, has been humoring the occasional bluffs or a group in the Army.

Leaving that matter aside, according to what I hear, the Army is indignant over the fact that the Grand Chamberlain disclosed the matter of the Imperial sanction of July 20. This is another matter entirely, but even if the matter is a rumor, it has a bad influence. Imagining reactionary movements after the war, I believe it necessary to keep such matters well in mind from the present.

I rejoice that the Navy Minister opened up convenient channels by which we could take an active part in the boundary problem. I deeply appreciate his consideration. The Navy, as a whole, is grateful that the Emperor has stated he will make a trip to the air arsenal. We also wish to express our gratitude to the Premier and to all of you for your thoughtfulness.

I have hastily written the above, stating only the essential items.

I also received the following letter from Admiral NOMURA dated the 5th:

Dear Sir:

I worried a great deal about the Changkufeng clash. If planes were to go into action, the stage would immediately be enlarged. If Soviet Russia should mistakenly believe that Japan is weakening, they might not hesitate to try something big in order to check the Hankow battle. Moreover, there is a third nation which desires a clash between Japan and the Soviet.

The fundamental policies regarding the China Incident are: a) It is absolutely vital that the present Incident not be magnified by a third nation. b) When a long view is taken of Japan's mission in the future, we must achieve the war's aim and must also establish a determination not to reduce our country to extreme exhaustion. I believe that we should proceed with satisfactory counter-measures and a policy of prompt decisions. Japan's spiritual strength is Japan's treasure, but if the politicians overestimate it, there is danger of re-enacting German events.

YONAI's attitude regarding this incident is magnificent. This may have been a plan of the Navy. However, he is, after all, indifferent to worldly gains and his mind is bright and clean. He stands above certain criticism, and therefore, can look at matters with a clear conscience. Those who place confidence in him know this strong point of his.

Navy Men Expound Views

There are Cabinet members who are die-hard proponents of a war with Russia, while others propose to remove all evil at its source by finishing off not only Russia but also England (including the United States and France) at one blow. They are heroes who would have us rush from our position as a stable power in Asia and dream of becoming the master of Asia. Therefore, we cannot relax our attention. They may be heroes, but if they were to deal with actual administration, they would be unable to carry out anything so rash. I think that their views would then concur with ours.

A second, third and fourth Changkufeng incidents will probably occur. If we are carelessly snared by what they say, the battle line in China might be reduced. After this, political powers hostile to Japan will make a comeback. It's just the same as air coming in when there is a vacuum. It was in Aesop or something, that when a dog had a piece of meat, someone showed him an ever bigger piece of meat. The dog immediately threw down the meat in his mouth and barked. He jumped for that big meat, but was unable to secure it. We would be just like that dog. It is a matter which calls for caution.

We must be firm. It is timely for the Foreign Minister to talk with the British Ambassador regarding Britain's profits in China. If he can, by his ability, draw England close and thus dishearten CHIANG, it will hasten the solution of the situation one step. In that case, Soviet Russia will develop anxieties and apprehensions regarding Great Britain, and will

RESTRICTED

probably held back rash attempts and blind acts somewhat. It is pertinent that the Foreign Minister is striving toward isolating China and checking aid from a third nation. However, there are those in Japan who say that any nation that aids an enemy nation is also an enemy, and they clamor that it is outrageous to negotiate with them. I laud their sincerity, but they are too impetuous. It is probably difficult for Japan alone to place China in a status similar to that of India, with an ambitious enterprise of universal goodwill, and to become, immediately, the master of Asia. I do not have a special relationship with the Foreign Minister, but I think it would be very good for the sake of the nation if his ideas were realized. How about devising a plan to guide these patriots (including the many rightist organizations)? I have felt this from before, and I think it would do well to spend one, two or three days' expense of war (one day's expense being around 10,000,000 yen). I hear that the Premier has this idea also and is trying to enlist the elder statesmen and make them serve. I pray that this can be realized soon. This is also an enterprise of national mobilization. (The foreign Minister stated that diplomacy is based on domestic administration).

I have, from time to time, listened to the talks of the intelligentsia, but no one seems to have a dependable fundamental policy of control. There may be emergencies from time to time in a war of carnage, but the China Incident will become something like dispatching soldiers indefinitely to 'Siberia'. And when

Japan is exhausted, Soviet Russia and England will not look upon her as gently as at present. When we consider these matters, we should conceive all possible means of breaking CHIANG right now. Even if CHIANG becomes no more, depending on Japan's actions, a second and a third CHIANG may come forth. However, that is a problem for the future."

On the morning of the 6th, I visited KIDO at his private residence. As I listened to his stories, it seemed that KIDO was also greatly worried. I told KIDO that there was fear that he might be used as a tool by SHIONO and HIRANUMA, and I also told him about MATSUI Kuka. I told KIDO: "Be careful,' but it seemed that KIDO was carrying matters out with a great deal of thought.

They said that instructions to SHIGEMITSU would be ready by the afternoon of the 6th. At noon on the 6th, I went to the Foreign Ministry to get the instructions to be sent to Ambassador SHIGEMITSU. Since yesterday, the War, Navy and Foreign Ministers had conferred regarding these instructions. It followed the policy set at the Cabinet meeting. The substance of the instructions were based on two things: one was what they (Russia) had said: "We will use the Hunchun Treaty as the foundation." The other was: "Depending on the situation, it's permissible to abandon Changkufeng. At any rate, we want to cease the fighting as soon as possible and want to check it as a sectional conflict between Japan and the Soviet. See LITVINOV as soon as possible and negotiate with him."

I took that telegram message back with me on the night of the 6th to Oiso. Early the next morning, I attached a letter and sent it to Prince SAIONJI's place at Gotemba through the station master.

Ambassador SATO came over around 10:00 o'clock on the morning of the 7th, as had been previously arranged. We discussed various matters. He stated: "I visited Foreign Minister UGAKI at his private residence yesterday morning. The Foreign Minister was very happy that I did. He said: 'I have been distressed because I have no one to consult. Won't you be my consultant?'

Regarding the talk of appointing Lt. Gen. OSHIMA as Ambassador, I said: 'That is absolutely out of the question. From the viewpoint of the foreign nations, you are an Army General, and they look upon you as an Army General functioning as a Foreign Minister. There are also many Generals and Admirals in your Cabinet. If you appoint an active service officer as Ambassador to Germany, they will conclude that Japan's foreign policy is being molded by the militarists. This is of course true, but, if you do such a thing, the foreign nations, who are already on their guard, will begin increasing their watchfulness. Ambassador OTT is a Maj. General of the German Army and has become the German Ambassador to Japan. However, this was possible because he was a Nazi. It's a fact that he was an Army officer but for a Lt. General of the Japanese Army to become an Ambassador is a matter of an entirely different nature.' He stated: 'I have to consider harmony with the Navy, and I won't such a thing.'

"UGAKI also said to me (SATO): 'It's all very well

for me to meet Ambassadors and Ministers of foreign nations. However, meeting persons on courtesy calls and being invited to insignificant dinners doesn't leave me any leisure to think quietly. I would like to have someone come and help me. Can't an Ambassador help a Minister directly? I would like an organ which will help me devise a system and be my consultant.' I replied: 'I shall think of something to the best of my ability.'"

I went to Finance Minister IKEDA's villa at Oiso before 11:00 o'clock. We met leisurely, as previously arranged, and discussed various matters. I was entertained at luncheon by Minister and Mrs. IKEDA. I left around 1:30. The Minister returned to Tokyo on the 1:50 train, and then went again to Karuizawa. I had recently thought it necessary to have Ambassador SATO and Finance Minister IKEDA meet. After they met, they both said: "It was very good," and were glad.

On the 8th, there were attacks at Changkufeng and Shachaofeng. Planes were used and there were many casualties. I was worried and phoned Vice-Minister HORINOUCHI and the Foreign Minister and asked about the situation. He (Foreign Minister) stated: "Reply telegrams from SHIGEMITSU are still coming in only gradually. Not only that, our men over there seem very aroused. I have talked this over with the Navy Minister. The Navy Minister was also very apprehensive and said: 'Let us determine to dispatch instructions at tomorrow's Cabinet meeting.' According to the telegram from SHIGEMITSU, he wants to cease the fighting with matters as they are at present. Russia is pressing us to withdraw our troops. Without consenting to this at once, he is

haggling for an agreement to cease hostilities with matters as they stand. This, according to the Navy Minister's observation, looks as if SHIGEMITSU is afraid of the Army or that he does not fully grasp the essence of this incident. That is, he doesn't understand the fundamentals of the instructions. It isn't good to haggle and take time over the matter, and I shall speak up at tomorrow's Cabinet meeting."

When I talked to Finance Minister IKEDA over the phone, Finance Minister IKEDA had similar apprehensions. He said: "I shall bring it up at the Cabinet meeting on the 9th and I shall encourage the Foreign Minister." I phoned the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal who was accompanying the Emperor during his stay at Hayama and told him about such matters.

I came out in the afternoon of the 9th. I met the Navy Vice-Minister around 3:30. He said: "The matter is supposed to have been finally settled today at the Cabinet meeting and the instructions made out."

When I met the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs around 4:30, he said: "We are still in consultation with the Army." It seemed as if he still hadn't seen the Minister who had returned from the Cabinet meeting. I said: "Isn't it better to carry out the matter as promptly as possible?" The Navy Vice-Minister had said: "The matter must be dispatched straightforwardly so that it will be easy to understand. I have seen today's draft of the instructions, but it was very unsatisfactory The matter must be stated a little more strongly and bluntly, or I doubt if the Ambassador will understand." I told Vice-Minister HORINOUCHI what the Navy Vice-

Minis'er had said.

I also met the Foreign Minister for a short while. The Foreign Minister said: "I shall carry it out in a hurry. In two or three days, we will know if Soviet Russia is doing this to check our forces in China before we take Hankow or whether she intends to fight in earnest." I said: "Naturally, Prince SAICNJI is also worried. Don't you think that this matter should be settled locally as soon as possible?" Then I went home.

Saionji - Harada Memoirs

Chapter 286
(13 August 1938)

Changkufeng Incident Settled

Translated by Miss Miwako Yanamoto

In the afternoon of the 10th, I visited the Premier at his official residence. I listened to the many things he told me, but he seemed very worried about the Soviet problem. I told him that preparations for the Diet must be ready. I said: "You must give a great deal of consideration to the problem of how you are going to deal with the right wing, or I think it will become annoying later on." I was going to speak to KONOYE from the viewpoint that it was necessary to quiet them. However, KONOYE said to me: "That is why I appointed SUETSUGU as Home Minister. However, everyone attacked SUETSUGU and made him powerless. How then can he quiet the right wing? The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal has no political insight."

I was going to tell him that the matter was not as he thought it was. However, he seemed very tired that day, and he also seemed quite worried about the Soviet problem. Therefore, I didn't say anything about it, but I told him what Adm. NOMURA had said when he came over this morning. "Both NAKANO Seigo and HONDA Kumataro are very quiet individually. NAKANO Seigo came over several days ago and talked for about two hours. He stated: 'I am regarded now as a die-hard. I am also strenuously advocating the die-hard's theory. However, if there was anything I thought was for the good of the government or for national policy, I would make a sharp turnabout any time and become quiet.'" Of course, KONOYE was aware of this. He commented: "NAKANO belongs to

RESTRICTED

the group that can be maneuvered with money. Therefore, I think they are comparatively easy to handle...." That was all we said about the right-wing that day.

Mention of TAKI, the President of the Planning Board, came up in our conversation. He (KONOYE) said: "I am distressed with TAKI. Something is really the matter with him these days." I replied: "If you want him to resign, I shall gladly make him resign. Shall I tell him so?" He answered: "Please wait a little while for that." I said: "In that case, it might be well to watch for a good opportunity and make him resign." We parted on that.

In the evening, I went and rested at Marquis INOUYE's place at Hayama. After dinner, I visited the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at Chojaen. I listened to the many things he had to say. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal said: "The Emperor is quite anxious about the Soviet problem. In the beginning, he had said: 'I absolutely forbid the use of military power.' In spite of that, force was used at Changkufeng on the 29th and this is an extremely outrageous fact. Also, when the Foreign Minister is asked: 'Is it all right for the right-wing to bluff a little?', he replied: 'It's probably all right.' If that's the case, I wonder about him." He seemed quite dissatisfied with Foreign Minister UGAKI. He continued complainingly: "Not only that, but Premier KONOYE seems to dislike to speak to people himself. He speaks through other people. Especially regarding the Army, he thinks only of asking the Emperor to speak to them, and is very irresponsible. I am dumbfounded at the Army, and especially His Imperial Highness

Prince KAN-IN, the Chief of the General Staff. It's beyond words." He was very indignant. He stated: "The Changkufeng problem must be settled somehow. It would be disastrous if it developed into something more serious."

I returned late that night to Oiso. I talked to Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO at 7:00 a.m. the next morning, the 11th. Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO stated: "In the afternoon of the 10th, the Foreign Minister sent another telegram to Ambassador SHIGEMITSU to the following effect: 1) Settle the matter quickly. 2) Consent to withdrawal to the lines as of the 29th. 3) Base the settlement on the Hunchun Treaty; also use other material for reference and determine a boundary line over there. 4) Permissible to withdraw one kilometer from the Changkufeng and Shachaofeng line and agree not to re-enter. Settlement will probably be concluded early."

I immediately phoned the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and asked about the situation. The Vice-Minister stated: "There has been no reply yet from SHIGEMITSU. According to the information in a Domei despatch from Moscow, cessation of hostilities has been effected. An official telegram should be coming soon."

In hopes of being in time before the Emperor's departure, I immediately phoned the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. I transmitted what the Vice-Minister of the Navy and Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs had related. Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal YUASA said: "It would be very good if it goes smoothly." He had some doubts, but he seemed glad.

At 3:30 in the afternoon, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs phoned me. He said: "An official telegram

came in a short while ago from SHIGEMITSU. Cessation of hostilities has been effected. First, troops on both sides will cease fighting at noon on the 11th; second, our troops will withdraw one kilometer from the present lines at midnight of the 10th, and at the same time, troops of Soviet Russia will maintain their present lines; third, the execution of this treaty will be conducted by representatives of local troops on both sides (the representatives to meet immediately after the cessation). The Emperor is on board the Natsugumo. A wireless will be sent to the Navy Minister from the Navy Ministry, and the Navy Minister will report the matter to the Emperor."

The Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs called again later and said: "The withdrawal of one kilometer has been revised. It has been decided that both Armies will remain at their present positions."

I called both the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet and the Premier and said: "Didn't it turn out very well?" However, the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet stated: "There are about 1,200 casualties. Also, we must be on our guard today until the execution has been completely accomplished. Premier KONOYE said: "It has cleared up for the time being, but we must be more careful from now on." It seemed that he was just catching his breath.

I reported the whole situation to Gotemba by phone. Then, in the morning of the 12th, I went to Gotemba. I made a detailed report to Prince SAIONJI in person. Prince SAIONJI said "It was good that matters were settled for the moment. I have been reading the

RESTRICTED

telegrams sent to and from SHIGEMITSU and the Foreign Ministry, and I think that diplomatic negotiations were practically clumsy. It is probably difficult since they are under restraint by the Army, and there are many orders. However, it's still very faulty. From now on, it will be a failure unless we have someone other than a militarist take charge of the administration. We must have for Premier someone who can be consulted in earnest and who has both domestic and foreign confidence. Why do the militarists place so much confidence in Germany? Every request they make is turned down, and yet they make such a big fuss over Germany. I just cannot understand the psychology of it."

He related: "Long ago, when I was in Germany as a young man, an old woman around sixty years old at the hotel where I was staying said: 'When I was young, we were very scared of England and France. However, Germans today treat the English and the French as though they were of a different race and consider them of little consequence. They think that their own country is the strongest, the best, and the greatest. But, I am positive that there will come a day when we will be defeated by England and France.' She lamented the fact that Germany was enraptured and thought itself so good at the height of BISMARCK's period. They were finally defeated by England and France at the time of the Great War. I do not know whether it was conscious or unconscious, but it is a fact that this old woman who knew nothing about politics felt that way at that time." I felt that he was comparing it to Japan of today.

Prince SAIONJI seemed very much in accord with

what I had told KONOYE about the right-wing, and I had also said it was absolutely necessary for the Vice-Ministers of each Ministry to be appointed as government delegates to the Diet from now on. He said: "When you return to Tokyo, please give my best regards to KONOYE, KIDO, and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal."

I returned to Tokyo in the afternoon. I went to the Premier's official residence around 3:30. I talked to KONOYE about many things. KONOYE said: "My mind has been eased for the time being, but I can't stand it." He related the fact that he had met ASOU of the Social Masses Party (Shakai Taishu-to). He said: "They have a philosophical foundation, and they are quite deep. KAMEI Kanichiro states that he would like to be on the non-official staff of the Cabinet. He wants to leave the Shakai Taishu-to." He was quite impressed by KAMEI. However, I knew the true facts concerning KAMEI and I thought that this was a troublesome matter as I came home.

Regarding NAKANO Seigo KONOYE stated: "He is not as deep as KAMEI or ASOU, but he also has a kind of philosophy." He was also very worried regarding the university problem. He said: "When ARAKI resigns, there is no one to become Minister of Education. I told KIDO a short while ago: 'Take it once more.' KIDO replied: 'I wouldn't do it for anything.' It's very distressing. On one hand, it is connected with the right-wing problem of men like TATEKAWA who talk of totally destroying the Imperial University. The Vice-Minister of Education (ITO) didn't know that matters would go that far, and he is now astounded." KONOYE was

very anxious about the problem of the Education Ministry. That evening KONOYE was departing for Karuizawa, and I left.

Then I went to the Foreign Ministry and met the Vice-Minister. The Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs stated: "It was good that the Changkufeng problem has now been settled. The night before the agreement was made, an official telegram that a military man might have sent came from SHIGEMITSU. Very surprised, the War, Navy, and Foreign Ministers kept an all-night vigil and the Europe and Asia Bureaus were considering counter-measures. However, that telegram came unexpectedly the next day, and we were relieved. For one moment, we wondered what would happen."

On the way home, I talked to Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO at the Navy Minister's official residence. He stated: "It was reported to the Emperor yesterday on board the destroyer that the treaty had been made. The Emperor was very glad, and at the same time felt relieved. The Navy Minister related this." I also phoned the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to ask about the matter.